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How can one find her voice in a tradition-soaked 
discipline such as Philosophy? This study explores the 
possibility of changing the structure of philosophical 
deliberation in order to reflect a shift in ethical, 
epistemological, and ontological orientation.
Each paper within this study is a methodological and 
contextual exploration. Paper #1, Dethroning the Porn 
Queen, looks at the legal liberal tradition and revisions 
the pornography debate within a feminist context. Paper 
#2 , By Whose Authority? A Look at the Interconnections 
Between Philosophy, Science, and Agribusiness, critiques 
an oppressive conception of science and philosophy while 
offering a relational paradigm. Paper #3, Reflection, 
Dialogue, Insight: Exploring Racism, uses a contrived
dialogue to make connections between racism and sexism, 
and to explore racism in the feminist movement.
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CONCEPTION
The following papers are experiments. I am searching 
for a way to do philosophy that is true to my voice and 
is reflective of the subject matter. This process is much 
like sculpting a three dimensional piece. In sculpture, 
there is a recognition that the form of the piece is an 
integral part of the content of the work - indeed it is 
part of the subject matter itself.
I have been trained in traditional philosophy. 
Philosophical theory is a method of objective argumentation. 
One states a thesis, then provides reasons or justifications 
for this thesis. Finally, the writer restates this thesis 
in the form of a conclusion. The conclusion must logically 
follow from the premises. Most importantly, the argument 
must be written in objective language; language that is 
emotionless, bodiless, and detached. Objective in that 
there is a radical separation between the knower and known. 
Theory must be set apart from the writer, distanced, because 
subjectivity contaminates Truth.
I have found that this form of traditional theory 
was unable to hold my views or the content of which I spoke. 
I felt that in using it, I was distorting my vision, 
objectifying my words, and confining the subject matter.
I felt that I was locked in a dark hallway when what I 
really wanted to do was walk outside. There are many ways
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in which I think that traditional theory distorts 
experience. In its attention to logic and rationality, 
it negates feelings as a valid route to knowledge. Perhaps 
there is a space to discuss feelings as an epistemological 
tool, but there is no space to feel, or to listen to 
feelings. In traditional theory's objectivity, it ignores 
the fact that subjective human beings are writing this 
theory. In its search for Truth, it ignores the 
complexities of truth. In its search for unified theory, 
it subjugates contextual lives to principles.
The above are generalized critiques which I see now 
after writing these papers. When I had tried to write 
them in a traditional method, I felt like I was walking 
into walls. My writing did not feel fresh, honest, or 
alive. I felt that the subject matter demanded something 
different. Women and nature can no longer be objectified. 
They are subjects in themselves and part of dynamic 
relationships. The things that harm women and nature, 
such as pornography, agribusiness, and racism, can not 
be spoken of in objective terms. Indeed it is objectivity 
which allowed the harm to be obscured in the first place.
As a writer, I feel that the subject matter demands that 
I honor my experience, emotions and intuitions as a route 
to knowledge. Subjectivity, then, nurtures understanding.
I began the process of experimentation so that I could 
write more honestly and completely. I am only beginning
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to explore, and I do not want to imply that I have found 
perfect or even adequate forms. Some things work and others 
fail miserably. Yet, even in the areas which fail, I still 
learn something. I remember the first time I sculpted.
I thought that I had this perfect idea on the subject of 
allocating rights. As I began to construct the piece,
I found that my idea was lacking. By constructing the 
form and seeing how the idea looked in a different light,
I enriched my vision. This is how I feel about these 
papers.
In the writing of this introduction, I have been 
focusing on myself and why I felt the need to do philosophy 
differently. I do not see this experimentation as only 
benefiting myself and my personal voice. As I said before,
I think that different forms need to be found in order 
to accommodate areas which philosophers are only beginning 
to explore. This would include such areas as environmental 
ethics, feminist theory, race theory, applied ethics and 
ecofeminism. I say this because I think the form should 
reflect a shift in epistemological, ethical, and ontological 
orientation.
In addition, I see a recognition of different voices 
and methods as a way of allowing people and philosophy 
to blossom. Maria Lugones, whose writings I work with 
in the last paper, says that white privileged women can 
and should make a space for women of color to articulate
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their experience. I see the process of experimenting in 
method as a way of creating space, of shaking up philosophy 
in a way that will allow for the hearing of different voices 
and different ways of seeing meaning. There are many 
diverse people in this world, and a variety of ways of 
doing philosophy. I think we should honor this and learn 
to listen to different voices, in form and content.
PAPER #1
DE-THRONING THE PORN QUEEN 
or
RE-VISITING THE LEGAL LIBERAL TRADITION 
AND TRYING TO MEND IT WITH OUR WORDS... 
SPEAKING ON PORNOGRAPHY
"Great, so you've found the 'right answer. But, now you're 
alienated from yourself and the entire universe."
Sue Bradford to JPN 20 May 1991
INTRODUCTION
As a word of warning, or perhaps a word in
anticipation, I tell you that in exposing the thoughts
of the legal liberals, I will be using the patriarchal
voice. This voice was brought to my attention by Susan
Griffin in her brilliant work Women and Nature. The Roaring
Inside H e r . I borrow her portrayal of this voice. Griffin,
who researched this voice says that it, "rarely uses a
personal pronoun, never speaks of 'I1 or 'we' and almost
always implies that it has found absolute truth, or at
1least has the authority to do so." Griffin writes that 
we can recognize this voice by the use of such phrases 
as 'it is decided t h a t 1 or 'the discovery was made'.
Following her, I too will attempt to reconstruct this 
voice. To me, this is the voice of the. legal liberals.
In her writing of the book, Griffin says: "this paternal 
voice became quite clear to me, and I was afraid of it." 
After reading her work this voice jumps out at me from 
many texts including the work of the legal liberals; I 
am also afraid of this voice. Yet, I seek to open it up 
for all to see as I introduce the thought of the legal 
liberals.
Later, in analyzing David A.J. Richard's segment 
"Obscenity", I have placed my own thoughts in parenthesis. 
His words are so insulting and disempowering that I could 
not let them stand alone. I talk back.
ii
THE POLITICS OF REASON
It is asked whether there is a shared objective point 
of view. If there is common ground on which to form a 
political arrangement. It is asked if there is a framework 
which can be the basis of law.
It is said that there is no connection between law 
and morality. That our political arrangements are merely 
practical. That humans are simply enlightened egoists 
and, "that the rational pursuit of self-preservation is 
what leads men to form commonwealths or states...[that 
there are] rules a reasonably being would observe in 
pursuing his own advantage."
It is said that there is a universal moral law. That 
an individual has certain basic rights, such as the right 
to freedom, property, and self-preservation. That men 
freely enter into legal contracts to protect their moral 
rights. That law allows men to pursue their own liberty, 
"and not be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, 
arbitrary will of another man."
It is said that there is an overlapping consensus.
This consensus is found to be the foundation for a political 
arrangement. It is decided that this consensus is really 
a moral consensus. That this consensus is a narrow, but 
a shared political morality.
In fact, it is said that this consensus is based on 
a political conception of justice which is itself moral; 
"it is a moral conception worked out for a specific kind 
of subject, namely, for political, social and economic 
institutions." It is decided that this overlapping 
consensus is an institutional morality.
It is decided that this institutional morality is 
a closed system. That it does not appeal to any wider 
conception of morality; that, "it looks initially to the 
basic [political] structure and tries to elaborate a 
reasonable conception for that structure alone."
It is found that this overlapping consensus is 
influential. From shared values, a legal system is born.
1
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It is decided that political men have all agreed to 
disagree. It is shown that law flows from the institutional 
morality. It is said that there is a Rule of Law.
It is said that there is a Rule of Law in which the 
institutional morality is contained, and that both are 
objective and knowable. It is said that in the Rule of 
Law, there is a system of rules. That there are primary 
and secondary rules.
It is decided that principles are included in the 
Rule of Law. That Law can no longer be seen in terms of 
primary and secondary rules. It is found that principles 
can be logically articulated from the institutional 
morality. That principles reflect the rights of 
individuals, and thus must be consistent and coherent.
That these principles must be carefully weighedgand measured 
when taking into account the rights of parties.
It is decided that when a judge hears a case, he must 
decide which basic rights are applicable. He must discover 
which objective, knowable principle the right is based 
on in the Rule of Law.
It is said that the Rule of Law is logical and 
knowable. It is said that certain distinctions can and 
should be made in deciding cases. That it is the judge's 
duty, "to discover wha^ the rights of parties are, not 
to invent new rights."
It is found that there is a distinction between policy 
and principle. Policy is concerned with the goals of the 
community, and consequently is not founded in the Rule 
of Law. Principles are concerned with individual or group 
rights. ^ c i ^ e d  that decisions should be made on
principle.
It is found that rights are built into the political 
institutional morality; that these rights are real and 
can be weighed and measured. It is agreed that a 
distinction must be made between concrete and abstract 
rights.
An abstract right has no weight. It, "is a general 
political aim of which does not indicate how that general
3
aim is to be weighed or compromised in particular 
circumstances against other political aims." In contrast, 
it is found that concrete rights have weight. They have 
weight, " a g a ^ s t  other political aims on particular 
occassions." Rights, it is said, can also be further 
divided into institutional, legal, and background rights.
It is said that in deciding cases, authorities have 
two obligations. One is to discover the rights of parties: 
institutional, not background, concrete not a b s t r a c t ^
Two is to discover the single and only right answer.
Hercules, with his power to overcome evil in a gradual 
and ordered way, is found to be the best role model for 
decision makers. Hercules understands the overlapping 
consensus, both historically and morally. He accepts that 
the rights theses hold in the community. Thus, he sees, 
"that judicial decisions must be taken to be justified 
by a r g u m ^ t s  of principle rather than arguments of 
policy."
Again, it is said that the institutional morality 
is knowable. Thus, Hercules understanding this, finds 
justification for principles. It is these principles which 
are weighed and balanced. In this way, it is said, Hercules 
can resolve conflicts. He can discover the rights of 
parties.
Tfc ★ ★
HOW THE LEGAL LIBERAL SPEAKS HIS MIND ABOUT THE BODY
The legal liberals, in their patriarchal voice, present 
the Rule of Law as being coherent and ordered. The system 
is tight and closed, and thus conflicts can be resolved 
by appealing to rationality. This attitude serves to 
silence people. Experience from the context of people's 
lives is not taken into account in the Rule of Law; value
4
is placed on discovering principles, without taking into 
consideration the deeper social and philosophical issues 
or the real feelings of people who are oppressed under 
the mythical Rule of Law. More properly this attitude 
should be called the 'logic of domination', ie, "a structure 
of argumentation which leads to a justification of 
subordination.
In this paper I am focusing on the issue of
pornography; more specifically, on 'hard-core' pornography,
which depicts the degradation and torture of women. Two
crucial waves are being seen in the pornography business
right now. First, the pornography business is expanding,
thus its scope is increasing. Second, the portrayal and
degree of violence against women is becoming more 
1 7pervasive. Before I discuss the philosophical issues 
underlying the brutalization of women in pornography, I 
will analyze how the legal liberals present their views 
on these issues. In particular, I am referring to David 
A.J. Richard's analysis. The patriarchal voice, in its 
dedication to the Rule of Law, is stikingly apparent in 
his sophisticated legal liberal argument.
For Richards, pornography is an issue of principles.
He is attempting to weigh and measure the concrete right 
of free speech as it applies to pornography, and the 
concrete right of people to be free from clear and present 
danger in their lives. His argument hinges on the concept
5
of 'obscene' as it is defined in Miller vs. California 
413 U.S. 15,24 1973 (quoting Roth 354 U.S. at 489). The 
current legal doctrine for indentifying obscenity is:
a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards' would find that the work, 
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest,
b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law,
c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks^gerious 
artistic, political, or scientific value.
He writes that this definition of 'obscene' itself does
not follow the institutional morality in the Rule of Law;
that it "expresses controversial moral judgments that no
longer command either general or critical moral 
1 9consensus." Since he believes that the current legal
notion of 'obscene' is unconstitutional, he looks for
principles within the institutional morality which can
be weighed and measured.
At issue for Richards is the right of free speech
found in the First Amendment. He writes that the exclusion
of obscene from protected speech is unprincipled. More
specifically, he argues that, "consenting adults have a
right to view pornographic materials and a denial of it
20would violate core free speech interests." For Richards,
this stems from the fact that the "restriction on the
pornographic is clearly directed at what is communicated"
21rather than a regulation of time, place or manner. This, 
he decides, is constitutionally questionable because, it 
rests on, "nonneutral assumptions inconsistent with the
6
required equal respect for moral independence....[and thus]
fails today to be a just application of the principle of
equal respect interpretively fundamental to the value of 
22free speech." (Why does he use the Puritan art analogy?
Why does he equate moral independence in choosing to watch
plays, with the portrayal of the brutal degradation of
women's bodies? Does this analogy fit? Does art make
me fearful? Vulnerable?)
It is decided that the questions of pornography and
Puritan ideas on art are a matter of principle;
" [plornography may not be art, but it is certainly a
communicative expression whose aim and effect are
imaginative, namely, the cultivation and stimulation of
23sexual imagination." (Why do I think of the woman strung
up by her legs? Why do I think of the woman who has her
breasts locked tightly in grips?) Richards decides that 
what is at issue is a person's moral independence to choose 
to watch hard-core pornography. (Why does he call it 
pornographic communication? What is being communicated 
to me as a woman? That the hatred of a woman's body is
acceptable. That it is alright to torture a woman - that
it is alright to send me through a meat grinder. That 
I am supposed to like this - that I can find this 
'communication' sexually stimulating?)
Thus, Richards has decided that the definition of 
'obscene' (Where is the context of our lives?) is
unconstitutional. He reevaluates ’obscene' and says that
pornography is a unique vision of sexuality, as opposed
to the rigid Victorian view of the body. (Why must he
trivialize our historical suffering as women? The loss
of self that we experienced under Victorian descriptive
and prescriptive images was harmful. We were told that
our bodies were unclean; that we were to be the upholders
of morality, and this meant denying our bodies. But wait.
We must bear children ... We must 'serve' our husband's
needs. Is this rape - smiling while being raped.) Richards
writes that pornography "offers an alternative model of
24plastic variety and joyful excesses in sexuality." (Get
out of your self-righteous modes, he implicitly tells us,
enjoy your sexuality.) Pornography, writes Richards, can
be, "engaged in the construction of more fulfilling and
25humane personal relationships." (Is he trivializing 
feminism? Carol Gilligan?)
Richards also realizes that he must weigh the principle 
of the clear and present danger of harmful acts. (A friend 
wrote a paper on pornography. She researched it first 
hand, visiting book stores, watching films and live shows. 
She told me that she became afraid; that one night her 
fiance and a male friend were sitting on the porch, and 
that she locked them out of the house.) Richards dismisses 
the danger principle easily on the basis that there is 
no ’reliable evidence' to support the claim that pornography
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endangers women. (Then why do I feel afraid. Is this 
irrational. Why since beginning this paper have I began 
having nightmares - that I knew him, trusted him - that 
he was chasing me - that he was going to kill me. I am 
fearful and no longer rational. My fear, my friend's fear, 
is denied; it is not provable.) Richards writes that the 
interpretive disagreements on the clear and present danger 
of harmful acts renders the weight of the principle 
non-existent. The debate, he says, reflects a larger moral 
controversy, outside the Rule of Law, "about which the
2 6state, on classical free speech grounds, remains neutral."
Thus, Richards concludes that hard-core pornography
is protected under the First Amendment. That, "the scope
of free speech be assessed in terms of facts and values
relevant to the independent exercise of our moral powers
27of rationality and reasonableness." Each individual 
person alone, it is said, must decide how to live her or 
his private life, and thus the state has no justification 
for censoring pornographic material.
Richards clearly subscribes to the Rule of Law. His 
argument is concerned solely with the institutional 
political morality, and the weight of principles governing 
the pornographic issue. His argument also rests on the 
fact that principle, rather than policy, must be taken 
into account. That is, the individual rights of people 
take precedence over communal goals. The underlying
9
assumptive value in this preference deserves further 
thought. Underlying his argument is a patriarchal 
conception of self as opposed to a feminist conception 
of self.
THE SELF AS MONAD
Richards stresses that it is up to each individual
alone to decide whether or not to read or view pornography.
This emphasis on the individual is typical of the male
conception of self. The masculine self is conceived
atomistically; the self is defined as isolated and separate.
As Carol Gilligan points out, this self fits into the image
of the hierarchy. In the masculine self, there is, "the
wish to be alone at the top and the consequent fear that
2 8others will get too close." Self is defined as alienated
from and in competition with others.
Jim Cheney adds another dimension to this conception
of self, which provides interesting insights into the legal
theory itself. Cheney, drawing from the words of Freud
and Gilligan, writes that, "men tend either to define
themselves as egoistic individuals or to identify with
29('fuse' with) large wholes." This conception of self 
is directly linked to the Rule of Law and the practice 
of law today. Later, I will critique the rights theory 
in general, but for now I want to draw some interesting 
connections between Cheney's thought and the legal liberals.
1 0
The atomistic self, writes Cheney, experiences
alienation and thus, because of a real human need for
relationships, seeks to overcome his isolation. (Cheney
is speaking about love, yet I find the insights are on
the mark in the metaphysics dictated by the male conception
of self.) Consequently, "there is an expansion of self
so as to include the relationship to which it feels
alienated. The whole is subsumed by the expanded self.
Thus, when Dworkin talks of policy, and the goal of
community, I think of this expansion of self. The goals
of community are essentially defined by the dictates of
the elite legal and philosophical community. (We need
a new baseball park for the community, because politics
is becoming too effeminate?) In a sense, rights are
expanded to others only in cases where the rights of an
oppressed group are seen as engulfable by their conceived
individual rights. Cheney writes:
it is interesting that there is a very strong tendency 
on the part of male theorists to understand networks 
of defining relationships on the mode of an expansion 
of self to the boundaries of the whole. This is, to 
be sure, a way of overcoming alienation, and as a 
way of having one's cake and eating it too, it can't 
be beat: one overcomes alienation from the other by 
absorbing the other into the s e l f ^ T h e r e  is however, 
no respecting the other as other.
Am I stretching the comparison too far? I don't
believe so. Through a long historical process women and
minorities have been allocated rights by the dominant
tradition. The right to vote was given to both.
11
Segregation was declared unconstitutional. Women were 
given the right to own property. Affirmative action 
programs were instituted. I do not want to deny the 
importance of these events, but I do want to point out 
their philosophical foundations. Essentially, it is a 
method of assimilation, a way of prescribing an 
individualistic world view - a way of expanding the notion 
of individual rights to people who were finally considered 
to be human. Until the recent help of feminist and race 
critics, there has been no attempt to respect the other 
as other. There was no acknowledgment that people may 
have different world views, different ideas of 
relationships, and different needs; not until recently 
in our Western tradition has this diversity been recognized 
and respected. And even today, only marginally so.
Jim Cheney writes that, "fusion is a move toward
health, which however, carries the sickness of atomism 
32with it." The sickness of the isolated self also carries 
with it the equally unhealthy conception of individual 
rights found in Western tradition and for my purposes under 
the Rule of Law. Individual rights presuppose this male 
conception of self, and underlying the notion of rights 
is the idea of competition. Marti Kheel perceptively writes 
that, "the notion of rights can, in fact, be conceived 
of only within an antagonistic or competitive environment. 
The concept of competition is inherent in the very
12
definition of rights. As Joel Feinberg states, 'To have
33a right is to claim something against someone...'" Thus
humans are seen to be individual, autonomous, rational
beings who are competitively attempting to maximize their
own interests.
The masculine conception of self also places extreme
valuation on reason. It is through reason that the
institutional morality, rights, and principles can be
understood. This is analogous to Lawrence Kohlberg's
analysis of (male) moral maturity. In writing about
Kohlberg's work, Gilligan says that men develop high stages
of morality, "where relationships are subordinated to rules
(stage four) and rules to universal principles of justice
34(stages five and six)." This is precisely what is
happening under the Rule of Law. Rational judges can
discover objective principles on which the one and only
correct answer is found. Similarly, "the rights conception
of morality that informs Kohlberg's principled level (stages
five and six) is geared to arriving at an objectively fair
or just resolution to moral dilemmas upon which all rational
3 5persons could agree." Gilligan may have added, on which 
all rational, isolated, competitive, alienated, 
rights-obsessed people could agree.
THE SELF AS WEB
Gilligan's book, In A Different Voice, opened up the
13
lives of women and exposed a sense of self that is not
consistent with the male-identified patriarchal self.
The feminine conception of self, according to Gilligan,
is seen in terms of webs of connections, rather than
isolation. Our conception of self is related to our
connections with others. Gilligan writes that our self
is defined in relationships of care and responsibility.
This is not to say that there is a complete absence or
suppression or sacrifice of self. Rather, we see our selves
as interconnected with others. We see ourselves as bound
together reciprocally. Ideally, we do not subsume the
other, nor alienate ourselves from the other. We are people
expressing our being in relationship. The following words
of Karen Warren ring true to me. She is speaking of rock
climbing, and of her relationship with the mountain, but
I find that her words express my perceived relationships
with other people as well as non-human nature. She writes:
"there is no fusion of two into one, but a complement of
two entities acknowledged as separate, different,
3 6independent, yet in relationship." This conception of 
self implies a morality different from a rights based ethic. 
If we see ourselves in relation to others then a moral 
theory emerges which is based on relationship. As Cheney 
writes:
the moral issue here is the correct relationship ... 
in order to understand what our relationships are, 
to understand what is required of us, it is necessary 
to understand the individuals involved (or.the nature
14
of the kinds of individuals involved), their 
relationships to 01^  another, and their place in a 
complex community"
Thus, Gilligan writes about how women, in particular,
flesh out moral dilemmas to resolve conflicts. When we
realize that relationships are important, not rights, then
we must begin by filling in what relationships entail.
I feel and I would argue that emotions are the binding
force of relationships. Emotions allow us to live in the
world rather than look at the world. Emotions are the
bonds which hold people together; they allow for connections
between beings who are not identical, but can express their
being in relation to another.
It is important to talk about how we feel, and listen
to the feelings of others. Hearing how people feel can
elicit empathy, and a new understanding of the ways people
live in the context of their lives. Many critical legal
theorists are placing value on how people feel in certain
situations. Here the importance of narrative within the
legal tradition comes clearly into focus. Patricia Williams
and Mari Matsuda have eloquently portrayed how people's
3 8lives are affected by racist speech. Lives come to the 
forefront, rather than principles; we begin hearing the 
stories of previously voiceless people in our legal 
tradition.
1 5
WHAT THE WOMEN ARE SAYING
The pornography issue is being examined by many 
feminist legal theorists. Feminists are divided on both 
the legal issues and the underlying assumptions; they offer 
a variety of rich arguments as they explore the issues 
in depth. I will begin looking at this feminist discourse 
by focusing on the work of Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea 
Dworkin. In their groundbreaking ordinance, they have 
provided an axis around which many debates have focused.
In 1984, MacKinnon and Dworkin proposed an ordinance 
which focused on the issue of pornography which was passed 
in Indianapolis, Indiana. In 1985, the Indianapolis 
Ordinance was brought to court by the American Booksellers 
Association. The District Court of the Southern District 
of Indiana ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. 
Later, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Rather than using the concept of 'obscene' which is 
not protected under the First Amendment, the ordinance 
defined 'pornography'. Under the ordinance 'pornography' 
i s :
the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women,
whether in pictures or in words, that also includes
one or more of the following:
1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy 
pain or humiliation; or
2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience 
sexual pleasure in being raped; or
1 6
3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or 
cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, 
or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or 
severed into body parts; or
4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects 
or animals; or
5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, 
injury abasement, torture, shown as .filthy or 
inferior, bleeding bruised, or hurt in a context 
that makes these conditions sexual; or
6) Women are presented as sexual objects for 
domination, conquest, violation, exploitation, 
possession, or use, or through posture|gor positions 
of servility or submission or display.
The Court of Appeals, in American Booksellers Ass'n Inc.
V. Hudnut, found this definition of 'pornography'
unconstitutional, and consequently found the Indianapolis
ordinance unconstitutional. The court continually referred
to the definition of 'obscene' which MacKinnon and Dworkin
purposely left out. The court, acknowledging the
constraints imposed by the rule of law, found the ordinance
unconstitutional because its definition of 'pornography'
did not match the Supreme Court's definition of 'obscenity'.
The court found that the ordinance, "discriminates on the
ground of the content of speech."^0
Mari Matsuda, in an article on racist speech, points
out that the content-based argument is one of the strongest
against the criminalizaton of speech. Matsuda writes of
the concern that, "it puts the state in the censorship
business, with no means of assuring that the censor's hand
41will go lightly over 'good' as opposed to 'bad' speech."
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There is also an argument that this ordinance puts us on 
a slippery slope. The state will begin censoring 
everything. Thus, it is argued that the state must uphold 
democratic ideals, while striving to promote tolerance 
and the free expression of ideas.
It sounds like a good argument on the surface, yet 
it is interesting to note how the theoretical claims are 
being carried out in concrete issues. I argue that the 
decision makers, while saying that they rationally look 
to principles are misguided (at best). They are strongly 
directed by images and their expectations of certain groups 
of people. This is seen quite clearly in recent court 
decisions that are affecting women's lives. On the one 
hand, in hard-core pornography, free speech is upheld above 
all else; despite the real harm to women in the form of 
fear of rape and violence. On the other hand, during the 
Bush administration under Title X, free speech was denied. 
Women who went into federally funded health clinics could 
not be told of the option of abortion, nor obtain any 
information on abortion clinics. Does this uphold the 
democratic ideal of free speech?
The court is clearly being influenced by two historical 
images which govern women's lives. Women are seen as 
whores, as in pornography, or as baby-making machines. 
Through the playing out of these images in the court system 
(among other places) women are being denied their own
1 8
bodies. I can not emphasize this enough. I am being denied 
my body - my self.
In pornography, women's bodies are objectified to 
be controlled and brutally mastered. This is an act of 
possession; it is the breaking of a woman's body to be 
used for sexual gratification. When I see a woman on film 
who is bound and gagged, or who has a pistol thrust in 
and out of her mouth, I am fearful and angry. Angry because 
it speaks to me of the fact that women's bodies are 
constantly being abused. Fearful, because I see the 
connection between these brutalizations of women on film, 
and my own fear as I cross the footbridge at night. I 
see the connection because I live with the knowledge that 
our culture condones violence against women in two pervasive 
ways. One, we promote it, as in pornography which is 
protected by the legal system. Two, we ignore it, as seen 
in the silenced voices of rape and abuse victims. This 
hatred of women's bodies has deep historical roots in 
Western society. I see the thread running from the 
sin-of-Eve, to the witchburnings, to pornography. Running 
concurrent with this image is the image of woman as breeder.
Under Title X, women were again being denied our 
bodies. We are implicitly and indeed explicitly told that 
our bodies are not our own. Rather, we are a passive 
receptacle waiting to be filled with child. These are 
the images which need to be uprooted and fought. They
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need to be looked at for what they are, and not hidden 
under some abstract principle, or lofty democratic ideals.
At any rate, the truncated vision of the Court of 
Appeals in Hudnut objected to the perceived inconsistency 
of the ordinance; under the ordinance the treatment of 
women as equals was seen as lawful, no matter how sexually 
explicit, while the treatment of women as submissive 
degraded objects was unlawful, no matter how artistic the 
work. Thus, the court claimed that, "the state may not 
ordain preferred viewpoints in this way. The Constitution 
forbids the state to declare one perspective right and 
silence opponents. "4^
Later, the court goes on to rave about the value of 
the First Amendment. The liberal government, unlike those 
dreaded totalitarian governments who 'rule' most of the 
planet, is different because of, "our absolute right to 
propagate opinions that the government finds wrong or even 
hateful."4'* It is extremely disconcerting that the court 
makes us argue on these terms. I am sure they recognize 
the necessity of this amendment for oppressed people in 
this country. It is our vehicle for change; it is something 
for which oppressed people have struggled to achieve.
At any rate, it is clear that the court is not really 
hearing what MacKinnon and Dworkin are saying. In a tight 
logical way, the court weighs principles, and decides that 
the right to free speech is the heaviest. Decision
20
affirmed; case closed.
But what are MacKinnon and Dworkin saying? They are 
rightly objecting to the brutal degrading objectification 
of women in pornography. These images do influence how 
people view women in our culture. For MacKinnon, these 
images reinforce the maledominated power structure. She 
writes:
pornography is neither harmless fantasy nor a corrupt 
and confused misrepresentation of an otherwise neutral 
and healthy sexual situation. It institutionalizes 
the sexuality of male supremacy, fusing the erotization 
of dominance and submission with the social 
construction of male and female...Men treat women 
as they see woman as being. Pornography constructs 
who that is. Men's power over women means th|| the 
• way men see women defines who women can be.
A woman who is portrayed as a sexual object who enjoys
being brutalized, sets up women for all kinds of abuse,
both physically and mentally. And within our current power
structure, this abuse is not only portrayed, it is acted
o u t .
MacKinnon and Dworkin seek equality for women in order 
to balance out the power structure. Robin West, in her 
article "The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
4 5Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory" , 
has criticized them and other radical legal feminists for 
this obsession with power. West believes that the radical 
legal feminists have a goal of an autonomous Kantian 
individual. She writes that radical legal feminists believe 
that women aren't currently autonomous because of their
21
political, legal, and social victimization. According 
to West, the feminist project is abandoned by speaking 
in a male-oriented power language, rather than attending 
to the voices of women. West's criticisms are well taken.
If MacKinnon and Dworkin are pursuing equality by trying 
to make women more like men in the hierarchy, then I think 
their work is seriously flawed. Yet, I think that MacKinnon 
and Dworkin are taking women in the right direction. Yes, 
there is a power discrepancy, but there is a layer 
underneath this which needs to be addressed.
To understand this underlying layer, and, perhaps, 
to keep the Indianapolis Ordinance on a feminist track, 
it is useful to remember the women's conception of self 
discussed earlier. Women's conception of self comes from 
our relations with others, thus, we are relational rather 
than autonomous individuals. But when there is a huge 
power discrepancy, as romanticized in pornography, the 
relationships are not healthy. One person, the male, has 
power over another, the female. There is no room for 
healthy relations among people in this scenario. Women 
are degraded to the status of an object - an 'it'. Power 
over, means denial of a person, who is properly a Thou.
Women are seen as objects to be beaten, fucked, and 
violently restrained; all as a means to some perverse notion 
of sexuality. These ideas are carried into, and affect, 
women's daily lives.
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West believes that we should listen to the voices 
of women, and I can only reply that I have heard them, 
just as I have heard myself. This power discrepancy is 
usually misused, and a man's ability to use power over 
a woman creates real fear in her life. Both violence and 
the threat of violence constrain women; sometimes we are 
too fearful to act or move. As West points out, we fear 
date and stranger rape, spouse abuse, and catcalls among 
other things. When I hear my friend talk about when she 
was raped, or another friend talking about how her husband 
threw her against the wall then kicked her as she fell,
I know that these are not isolated occurrences. I know 
that this fear comes from the same source as the fear I 
felt when a man in a local book store leered at me over 
the rack of pornographic magazines. As women, we know 
this fear; we live with the threat of violence daily.
Living with this kind of fear, spurred by the power 
discrepancy, there is little room for healthy relationships 
within our community. Women tend to deny ourselves as 
we try to conform to the images prescribed under the 
hierarchy. We lose ourselves, and rather than entering 
into an I/Thou relationship, we enter into master/slave 
relationships. By living for the other person we become 
objects of possession.
It is insulting that the violent portrayal of these 
unhealthy master/slave relationships is protected by law.
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What is more frightening perhaps is that many women do
not see pornography as affecting their lives. I relate
this tragically and most readily to the words of Philip
Hallie. He writes that in institutionalized cruelty (such
as racial hatred, or in this case, misogyny), there is
a "persistent pattern of humiliation that endures for years
in a community, [and in it] both the victim and the
victimizer find ways of obscuring the harm that is being 
4 6done." We need to bring this harm to consciousness.
That involves women speaking out to each other, to members 
of the community, and to the legal system.
The Indianapolis ordinance provides feminist legal 
critics with fertile soil for debate. Feminists are not 
in consenus about the ordinance; some agree with its 
approach, others disagree. Even so, the ordinance has 
provided a backdrop against which feminists flesh out the 
issue. In order to bring greater clarity to this 
discussion, I will explore two other feminists texts; a 
brief from the Feminists Anticensorship Task Force (FACT) 
and the article, "The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives:
A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory" by 
Robin West.
The FACT brief, written by Nan D. Hunter and Sylvia 
A. Law, opposes the Indianapolis ordinance. The criticisms 
stem from the vagueness of the terms, the sexual 
stereotyping of men and women, and the problematic
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connection of violence and sexually explicit speech. Most 
crucial is their objection to the vagueness of terms, and 
how overbroad enforcement could censor crucial feminist 
expression.
The FACT brief points out that the language of the
ordinance authorizes censorship of not only violent
material, but also any material that is sexually explicit:
the language of the definition mixes phrases that 
have clear meanings and thus ascertainable applications 
(e.g. 'cut up' or 'mutilated') with others which are 
sufficiently elastic to encompass almost any sexually 
explicit image that someone might find offe^sjive (e.g., 
'scenarios of degradation' or abasement').
The FACT people rightly point out that these definitions
are unclear, and their interpretations by different judges
would vary immensely. They argue that there is no clear
legal definition for these terms. Also, they argue that
the meaning of the work as a whole often derives from the
context rather than specific isolated instances of
'subordination' or 'degradation'. They write:
whether a specific image could be found to 
'subordinate' or 'degrade' women may depend entirely 
on such factors as the purpose of the presentation; 
the size and nature of the audience; the surrounding 
messages; the expectation and attitude of the viewer; 
and whe^g the presentation takes place...among 
others.
These two factors, the vagueness of the terms and 
the lack of consideration of the overall meaning, are 
problematic. The FACT people rightly point out that under 
this ordinance a large amount of valuable material could 
be censored. Thus, the, "Amici fear that the
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experimentations of feminist art which deal openly and
explicitly with sexual themes will be easily targeted for
4 9suppression under this ordinance." Their concern is 
justified. Lesbian, bisexual and heterosexual women are 
reclaiming their bodies and openly exploring their 
sexuality. To censor the rich feminist expression that 
is blooming would be a huge disservice to women.
Yet, I object to the fact that this issue is being 
viewed as an all or nothing distinction. That is, must 
we censor all or nothing? A finer distinction should be 
made, and that would be the distinction between pornography 
and erotica. Pornography can be seen as the violent 
physical exploitation of women. Erotica could be seen 
as non-violent sexual exploration.
Robin West points out that before we start making 
any distinctions, we need to begin listening to the voices 
of women and how they feel on the subject. She points 
out that the writers of both the ordinance and the brief 
have abandoned the feminist project by subscribing to 
definitions and principles rather than attending to the 
narratives of women.
West argues that the subjective lives of men and women 
are different. She is listening to women and has 
brilliantly articulated the fear that women live with in 
their daily lives: the fear of street hassling, rape, and 
abuse. Most interesting for my purposes in this paper
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is her attendance to women's hedonic lives. She criticizes
MacKinnon and Dworkin with overlooking this aspect of
women's lives, by calling it a 'false consciousness'.
She criticizes liberal legal feminists, like the FACT
people, with retreating to liberal principle; focusing
on choices rather than lives. She writes that they feel
that "fantasies are private and beyond political analysis;
the role of law should be to expand, not shrink, the options
available to women, including the option, if freely chosen,
50of masochistic desire, fantasy, practice, and pleasure."
West, in contrast, honestly looks at women's accounts 
of their expressed pleasure in erotic submission and 
domination. She recounts the Story of 0 by P. Reage in 
which O enjoys submission which is often painful. She 
then relates this to Maria Marcus' own identification with 
this enjoyment. As I understand it, Marcus and West are 
saying that there is a fine distinction between pleasure 
and pain. The pain is something which needs to be worked 
through and then used as a sexual stimulant. In Marcus' 
words:
[Pain] has to be passed. There has to be a moment 
when I hate you and loathe the pain, and only wish 
I could get away from it. But once you have been on 
the pain-level, ^  can be used sexually at another 
moment in time.
An interesting aspect of this pleasure found by women 
in S&M sex is the element of trust. West writes that 
painful acts of dominance and submission is an expression
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of trust, and is exciting for some women. She writes:
Absolute pliant obedience - the willingness to 
transform one's subjectivity into another's object 
- is sexually arousing (for some) when it enables 
the submissive subject to transcend her own selfhood, 
and thereby to abdicate her responsibility for her 
own action. That this total abdication of 
responsibility can be erotic, I think, r e j e c t s  a 
genuine human truth and a deep human need.
I want to reject this notion, and attribute it to
the 'false consciousnesss' that MacKinnon speaks of. For
so long women have given themselves completely to another,
whether it be a husband, lover, child, or boss, I feel
that this is a harmful playing out of our victimization.
Also, I feel that this practice violates the boundaries
of trust appropriate within relationships. To me there
is something dangerous and oppressive in the notion of
trusting someone when he or she is causing real bodily
pain; why risk the danger of giving up one's own body and
one's self? West admits that O reaches a point where her
submission is no longer pleasurable, but harmful. To me,
this seems the logical outcome of these relationships.
Yet, I hesitate to condemn. I have not experienced
this. I do not understand what these women are talking
about. Because of this, I appreciate their honesty in
exploring and expressing these experiences. They are trying
to come to some understanding of this in their own lives,
and I will listen. This is important to me. I am realizing
that under the patriarchy in which we live, women are
wondering who we are. We are trying to articulate our sense
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of self, and in this way we can learn to relate honestly 
with others.
Despite my lack of understanding and skepticism on
this issue, I think that West has provided some valuable
insights which can help us as we flesh out the pornography
issue. Speaking again of fear and trust, West writes:
I believe that sexual submission has erotic appeal 
and value when it is an expression of trust; is 
damaging, injurious and painful when it is an 
expression of fear; and is dangerous because of its 
ambiguity: both others a n ^ w e  ourselves have difficulty 
in disentangling the two.
Yet, it is an important step to try to disentangle the
two. As I see it, this could provide a way to further
distinguish between erotica and pornography. Erotica is
based on trust, whereas, pornography is based on fear.
This distinction would most likely mend the differences
between the writers of the Indianapolis ordinance and the
FACT brief. This distinction addresses the most important
issue we face in pornography: the fact that pornography
elicits fear of violence in women's lives.
West writes about the issue of violence. She wants
to look at how it affects women's lives. She warns us
to be clear on the issues, "it is the injuries that
pornography causes the violent expropriation of our
sexuality - which is the 'muck we can live without1."54
West advises that we relook at the overbroad definition
of pornography, and more importantly that we look at
pornography itself as we search for solutions. I must
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admit that if I'm going to talk more about this I'll need
to watch and read pornography. So far, I understand the
fear part (having watched Not a Love Story and having lived
with fear), but I am very ignorant about the pleasure in
submission part (indeed I find it hard to believe). Yet,
I do have eyes and ears and I can listen to the women who
are exploring this.
West provides us with a direction. She writes:
If we look at what is presently and too broadly defined 
as pornography, we might discover that the pornography 
that hurts us - the pornography that contributes to 
the violent expropriation of our sexuality - is not 
so hard to distinguish from the pornography that 
doesn't hurt us and which might be pleasurably - the 
description of controlled erotic submission.
I think that this area needs exploration, and it seems
that it has the potential for providing common ground for
feminists, because it addresses the real problem in women's
lives: violence and the threat of violence.
CONCLUSION (when the uninitiated must stop)
This paper states that I have little faith in the 
legal liberal tradition. In it, I see dehumanization and 
oppression. I am impressed by the good work that has been 
done by the critical legal theorists in deconstructing 
the underlying assumptions and the concrete practices of 
the legal liberal tradition.
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There is another step; one that is perhaps harder 
and one that is being taken by the critics. A need for 
the articulation of oppressed people is seen, and critics 
are stepping in to fill the void with their words. We 
need to change the system with our narratives, philosophies, 
and insights. We must speak of our fears and our strengths. 
I have faith in humans. I think we have a deep human need 
to relate to each other and a willingness to understand 
each other. I appreciate the work of the race and feminist 
critics. Their words are changing the legal tradition; 
MacKinnon's work on sexual harassment is a good example 
of this. I know it is hard and I realize that there is 
resistance, but we can gain strength from the words of 
others. We can explore our selves and the context of our 
lives; the expression of which allows for healthy change.
Let us make our presence felt.
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PAPER #2 
BY WHOSE AUTHORITY?
A LOOK AT THE INTERCONNECTIONS 
BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND AGRIBUSINESS.
Written by Ken Stocks and Lisa Gerber
INTRODUCTION
The following paper was written by Ken Stocks and 
myself. There are several sections of this paper: sometimes 
we speak together, sometimes alone, and sometimes in 
dialogue. We choose this form for many reasons. This 
is a way to engage in philosophy as a process and dispel 
the myth that philosophy (or science) has the authority 
to claim absolute truth. Also, we wanted to work with 
the concept of communication - of listening and speaking, 
of thinking and feeling. There are networks of dialogues 
in this paper. Among them are dialogues between Ken and 
myself, between a farmer and the land, and between 
philosophy and science. We wanted to attend to these 
relationships in the writing of this paper.
This paper was presented in the seminar, "Challenges 
to the Authority of Science" which Burke Townsend offered. 
Robert Hamilton, Anne-Marie Lombardi, Jamey Loran, Leslie 
Ryan, Danny Smitherman, David Stokes, John Weidner, as 
well as Ken and I participated in this seminar. I give 
you these names for two reasons. One, it will help with 
clarification, because we refer these people within the 
paper. Two, because we want to honor the people in the 
seminar. Not only did we challenge science, but we 
challenged each other. What is remarkable is that we did 
this respectfully and in a way that nurtured communication 
and dialogue.
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Food production is a cultural necessity. If modern 
science works, then its application to agriculture must 
flourish with the fruits of its labor. And, conversely, 
if modern science is destructive in its application to 
agriculture, then its failure in this area would be a strong 
argument to revise or reject the entire project. Without 
food, even scientists die.
In 1972, Jim Hightower wrote an analysis of the 
interconnectedness of agriculture, science, technology, 
business, government, and education called Hard Tomatoes, 
Hard Times. In the study's introduction, Senator James 
Abourezk said one of the results of this interconnectedness
-jis that, "...an entire rural culture is disappearing."
A spokesman for an association of land grant colleges
justified this 'disappearance' by saying:
Great agricultural achievements are not accomplished 
without some side effects, and the accusation that 
the land grant colleges and universities have been 
taken over by the great food conglomerates and have 
driven the little farmer out of business tend to 
overlook the dazzling array of ^bundant foods this 
cooperation has made available.
And former secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz added, "adapt
or die."'*
Adapt to mechanized monoculture, high yield 
hybridization, high tech processing, high input use of 
chemicals and fertilizers, intense competition for 
centralized markets and transport systems - adapt to all 
of this or die.
1
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Most of us can still remember, if not taste
Thanksgiving dinner. There can be little doubt in our
minds that we have access to an abundance of food, even
an over-abundance. Even if, "rural America is crumbling"^,
we are being fed. For all the evils of an interlocking
meta-institution of science, business, government,
technology, and agriculture, we are being fed.
Who cares if Hightower is right when he whines,
Land grant colleges have become closed communities.
The administrators, academics, and scientists, along 
with USDA officials and corporate executives, have 
locked themselves into an inbred and even incestous 
complex and they are incapable of thinking beyond 
their self-interest an^ traditional concepts of 
agricultural research.
So what if he is right? We are still eating .. most of
us. To make an omelet, eggs get broken. Hightower, who
is not a philosopher argues that, "... technology,
6productivity, and efficiency should be humanized." Sure, 
as long as we keep eating, right?
We are still eating and, at worst, as one consumer 
spokesperson has testified before Congress: "the consumer 
pays for the research, pays for the product, then pays
7by consuming a food which is either junk or dangerous."
Well, maybe it does get a little worse. Perhaps the 
current marrying of science and business to education and 
government has created an agricultural system that is 
feeding us in this decade by starving us in the next decade. 
Unless, of course, we are rich or powerful.
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<Ken>
As a deconstructor of the scientific method, I must 
answer many difficult questions. An example of one of 
the most difficult questions is: If science ends, what 
will we do with the millions of genetically identical white 
mice? Another example: if science ends, how will we build 
sewer systems?
For me, these questions are critical. I have 
nightmares about white mice and I used a laser at my last
good paying job to lay sewer pipe to grade.
But I ruptured a disc in my back laying some of that 
pipe and I can no longer kill white mice.
There are other important questions. What do we do 
with nuclear waste or even conventional waste? How do 
we restore acid damaged water systems? How do we feed 
excess populations (or even necessary populations, which,
I hope, include myself)? What do we do if we have breast 
cancer or AIDS?
I want to stop science on mere philosophic grounds.
I feel no great trepidation for doing this because I have 
been assured by Hume that even if I am wrong, a wrong
philosophy can, at worst, make me ridiculous.
Who among you, or among those at MIT, Sandia Labs,
RIBI Immunochem or at any other center of science dares 
to fear the ridiculous?
Until I took this course, I was unaware of the extent
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to which science is under attack. Its collapse appears 
immanent and I almost hope that it holds together for at 
least a few more months. My brother is one semester away 
from becoming a high school science teacher. Out of love 
for him, and because I can not afford to feed his family,
I will wait until he has accepted a teaching contract before 
I put a 'Separate Science and State' bumper sticker on 
my CO 2 spewing '62 Chevy.
Philosophically, then, why do I maintain that the 
scientific method should be abandoned?
If we accept the premise that our primary world view 
is scientific and that science is value free, meaning that 
science discovers facts and that facts in themselves have 
no moral content (again I am back to Hume).
And if we also accept Plato's position that our world 
is held together by morality.
Then looking at the world scientifically would destroy 
the world.
Symbolically, this would be represented as:
S 3 ~ M  
*MD*W
S______
When S is science, M is morality, and W is world.
Hume was right. Plato and I are beginning to look
O
pretty ridiculous. Besides, Alasdair MacIntyre 
persuasively argues that we no longer experience an ethical 
world anyway so maybe it is just Plato's world that has
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come unglued and the paradigm of the modern world is
incommensurable to his.
Ironically, MacIntyre uses an analogy of what our
concept of science would become if it was suddenly
fragmented to demonstrate how our view of ethics is 
9fragmented. After reading Popper and Kuhn and Feyerabend^
I have decided that MacIntyre's analogy is a poor one - 
science, too, is fragmented and MacIntyre's paradigm is 
as incommensurable as Plato's.
Back to incommensurability. Dan has stated, using 
Feyerabend and Kuhn as referents, that experiencing the 
world through one paradigm precludes experiencing the world 
through any other paradigm.
Accepting Kuhn's and Feyerabend's claim that science 
cannot provide truth sets up another piece of amateur logic.
If truth exists then it is our duty as philosophers 
to seek it even if we can't find it. Again I am referring 
to Plato.
If we look at the world scientifically, we cannot 
look at the world in any other way.
Science cannot discover truth.
Therefore, as philosophers, we must break out of the 
scientific paradigm.
Those are the arguments for abandoning science that 
make little or no difference. But I have another reason 
that does make a difference, or, at least, made a difference
6
back when I used to be a human being.
("Pilate saith unto him, 'What is truth?"1
I saw a film clip purportedly made in a concentration 
camp during WWII. A man with a rifle would strike a small 
boy with the butt of the rifle, then another man, wearing 
a white smock, would have the boy try to walk a straight 
line or touch his finger to his nose or do some other 
structured task. The man in the smock was a sadist of 
course, and not a scientist. Or maybe the whole thing 
was a hoax - a Zionist conspiracy or an Allied propaganda 
film.
It doesn't matter. The method and the purpose made 
perfect sense to me and I do not doubt, assuming the 
truthfulness of the film itself, that significant progress 
was made in the area of diagnosing and treating head 
injures. I can even imagine that the results of the 
experiment were used to save many lives.
I saw on television (this, too, may have been a hoax)
that a French doctor was so certain that he had developed
an AIDS vaccine that he had injected himself with the AIDS 
virus. Again, the design and methodology made perfect 
sense to me.
I, too, am a scientist. I once did a study of the 
effects of specific anti-convulsant drugs on blood-gases. 
For part of this study I required fully oxygenated aortic 
blood. A graduate student held a white mouse which I
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injected a needle through the mouse's sternum. My hands 
were shaking so much that during my first attempt I pushed 
the needle through the mouse's body and into the graduate 
student's palm. After three attempts, my hands quit shaking 
and I extracted the required blood.
As far as I know, the results of my experiment were 
never used to save any lives, but I got an 'A' in molecular 
biology lab.
A few years later, during my next attempt at higher 
education, I refused to etherize and dissect a frog. The 
dissection was a course requirement but I knew that my 
hands would not shake.
There is much to be said for steady hands. The surgeon 
who scraped and sculpted my fourth lumbar vertebral disc 
had steady hands. A few hours after the surgery, I could 
walk again. I have little doubt that he has dissected 
many frogs, impaled many mice. I have no doubt that he 
never watched as a young boy's head was smashed by a rifle 
butt.
But I would wager that he would understand the 
experiment at least as well as I understand, and I wonder 
if he ever misses the person he was when he picked up a 
scalpel for the first time - and his hand shook.
Dan has poignantly stated his concern that science 
turns everything sensible into an object and that once 
we are objects, we can never be anything else and can never
8
see anything else. We are left muttering to ourselves,
'I am not an object, I am not an object, I am not an 
object.1
Muttering, of course, in syntactically correct English 
using subject-verb-object sentences.
One of the essential premises for a scientific paradigm 
is that of self intending subjects - the radical ego - 
distinct from an objective environment. An ego so distinct, 
in fact, that its own cranium, heart, genitals, souls, 
and hands are considered environment, conceptualized as 
obj ects.
The only process preventing these egos from falling 
into solipsistic philosophies (and many of them collapse 
into solipsism anyway) are shared conceptual constructs 
- primarily language. Thus Lois Welch (U of M's creative 
writing director) can say at a Philosophy Forum, "If 
language is not our world, then what is our world?"
Her question was a rhetorical response to Derrida's 
deconstructionism of Heidegger's constructed world.
11Beaudrillard refers to it as the "evil demon of images."
Our world, the ground of our being, is nothing more than 
words that refer to other words and images that refer to 
images.
Its ontology is circular, its metaphysics is 
self-referential, and its epistemology is cultural 
phenomenology. Instead of this 'constructed world'
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expressing any spirituality or divinity inherent in either 
ego or being, it has created a barrier between ego and 
being, and consumes both. According to Heidegger, we live 
in the world that we have thought. According to 
Beaudrillard, we can live in no other world. According 
to Derrida (and Beaudrillard) this world has no ontological 
relevance. According to MacIntyre, this world has 
fragmented the moral, the ethical. Unfortunately, and 
contrary to Hume, a philosophy based on this world (the 
'constructed world') is not only ridiculous, but 
destructive.
The economic and political impetus for science is 
the exploitive application of knowledge to resources to 
produce technology. Many have argued - Jamey, John, David 
and others - and argued passionately and logically, that 
science can be separated from the destructive uses of 
science.
But, I agree with Harding when she states that even
though individual scientists may have lofty goals and
ideals, science itself functions to perpetuate control
1 2of the many by the few.
This oppression is inherent in the subject-object 
distinction used to justify an ego (a self-intending 
subject) when it places nature on the rack to reveal her 
secrets (to paraphrase Bacon) or to oppress animals because 
they are not self-conscious (to paraphrase Kant).
1 0
The fact-value distinction, necessary to pursue modern 
science, removes any moral limit that science might 
self-impose and makes science oppressive without limit, 
destructive without limit, and exploitive without limit.
The naive faith that the science that fathered the 
technology that has created such huge social, environmental, 
and spiritual crises is necessary to resolve these same 
crises makes the mythical casting of virgins into a 
volcano's mouth seem reasonable, rational, and responsible.
We live in the world that we have created. And it 
has created us. We can refer only to the world, and it 
refers only to us.
The greatest illusion of all may be that we can replace 
this paradigm with a paradigm that is healthy, nurturing, 
and communal. Perhaps the most we can do is put on sack 
cloth and ashes, and lift up our hands to Newton's particle 
system heaven.
A parable:
One day, not long from now, Frankenstein's monsters 
went into a pointless, pain-driven rage and killed Dr. 
Frankenstein.
Since they were mindless, soulless, spiritless, and 
had been killing themselves, their children, and one another 
for generations; no one even noticed that Dr. Frankenstein 
was dead.
Eventually, their mismatched arms and legs rotted
11
from their torsos and the metal rods rusted from their 
necks. Their heads rolled into the dust, and they died.
But - and I say 'but1 only because I love happy endings 
- some of their children survived.
★ ★ ★
<Lisa>
Science. Just saying the word makes me feel numb, 
vague. I wonder how to express what I perceive to be the 
oppressive nature of science in a few minutes - that is, 
shortly and concisely. How can I fit this into a tight, 
logical argument? How can I force myself to compact all 
the feelings and reasonings that I have about science into 
a little gem of truth?
I guess I'll start with a story. A story that is 
hard for me to tell, because it brings many themes to the 
surface - themes that touch me and touch the ones I love.
My father is a nuclear physicist. A plasma physicist 
to be precise. He works for Sandia National Labs in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. He is working on many projects 
that I can only see as destructive. Some are secret.
Others are referred to vaguely as Star Wars research, 
lithium research, fusion research. My father works with
12
lasers.
Currently, he is studying lightning. He is fascinated 
by it, and tells me about lightning balls, and how lightning 
travels, and how one can really be safe in a lightening 
storm. When he speaks of these things, he is filled with 
awe and wonder. And fear. He speaks of the fear and 
respect that comes from understanding how lightning 'works'. 
I admire his sense of wonder. My heart leaps when I hear 
people talk with respect for and awe of nature.
But, my father's story does not end here. He is 
studying lightning for a purpose. Perhaps, by removing 
the threat of lightning, NASA rockets can take off on 
schedule. Or perhaps, the Forest Service could have the 
lightning discharged from clouds early, so that dry forests
would not be threatened by fire. Yellowstone could have
been saved.
Crazy. Dad, I say, this is crazy. What about the 
effects on the ecosystem? Why do you want to manipulate 
nature in this way? What gives you the authority? You, 
who taught me about respect and dignity - how can you think 
about or act upon nature in this way.
Part of me wants to defer to authority - to my father's
authority, to political authority, to scientific authority. 
But, I can not. I am angry. For the moment, however,
I'll let my anger rest. For the sake of philosophical 
argument, I will follow along the lines of Jack Turner.
13
He writes: "but for the present let it be, at best, 
controversial, and at worst improper, to have strong moral 
feelings about the treatment of animals, plants and places 
- an emotional mistake - like being in love with the number 
2.1,1 3
I can, though, legitimately attack the authority of 
science on philosophical grounds.
First, the scientist starts with a dangerous 
metaphysical assumption. Theirs is a metaphysic that views 
nature as mechanical and inert. As Merchant points out 
this view of nature as dead justifies many violent and 
destructive acts upon the earth. Humans are seen as the 
center of this world. This type of anthropocentrism fueled 
by the mechanistic world view has reduced human capacity 
to see the world as a complex, interrelated, and alive 
system of which humans are a part.
The mechanistic world view has been and is challenged
by many people - ecofeminists, Native Americans, women
from India. These people in one way or another incorporate
a life principle into their metaphysics. From this an
ethic of respect is developed. As Chief Smohalla cries,
"you ask me to plough the ground: shall I take a knife
and tear my mother's bosom? You ask me to cut grass and
make hay and sell it and be rich like white men; but how
1 4dare I cut off my mother's hair."
In contrast, assuming the world is dead and inert
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leads to dangerous epistomological assumptions. The 
capacity for humans to know nature is severely diminished 
by excluding and marginalizing other knowers and by 
excluding other ways of knowing. For example, scientists 
are perceived as the proper knowers of nature. These 
experts, fueled by scientific and political authority, 
have muted other voices. Midwives and herbalogists are 
trivialized, at best, or put to death, at worst.
It is no coincidence that the most brutal and widespread 
witchhunts occurred during the beginnings of the scientific 
revolution. The words of Smohalla are scoffed. What does 
he know about soil composition, or pest control, or the 
genetic make-up of hay? Ask the experts.
This brings us to the other aspect of the 
epistemological assumption, that of excluding other ways 
of knowing. This is seen quite clearly in the work of 
my father. The way he comes to legitimately know lightning 
is in the lab - through time lapse photography or by 
studying the electrical charges. To use Bertrand Russell's 
vocabulary, he knows a lot by description. That is, he 
may know it abstractly. I would argue, however, that he 
also has knowledge by acquaintance, but he refuses to value 
this knowledge. He does experience fear and awe while 
immersed in a lightning storm (my mother can attest to 
this). The world is saying something to him - perhaps 
speaking of power, or dynamics, or life. Yet, my father
1 5
does not hear. He ignores this knowledge, perhaps as 
irrational, as he goes back to the lab, believing the only 
way to know lightning is through abstract rational study.
Connected with this bias is an ontological assumption: 
that is, things are seen as isolated and separate. This 
idea that things can be separated out from a larger whole 
allows us to view the world with blinders, and it bases 
our ontological assumptions on alienation and 
non-participation. Thus, my father is perfectly validated 
within his profession to study lightning as an isolated 
unit in an attempt to solve a specific problem. Never 
mind that ecologists are screaming that things in the world 
do not have these characteristics. After all, the world 
is a system of parts in relation. Tampering with one aspect 
affects the whole.
These assumptions lead to an ethical breakdown which
justifies the manipulation and domination of nature and
the marginalization of people including the radical
separation of cultures from other cultures. Yet, by
listening to excluded voices, one can come to understand
that the world is an alive, complex system of interrelated
parts. With this in mind, other types of ethical maxims
come to the fore. As Aldo Leopold writes: "a thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability,
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it
1 5tends otherwise." Or, as ecofeminists point out, we
1 6
must realize that we are relational beings, and we must 
ask ourselves in each instance if we are preserving a 
healthy relationship. Viewed from these two perspectives, 
my father's actions are morally wrong. There is no 
justification for tampering with nature's processes in 
order to control forest fires, or to control rocket take-off 
times.
Another ethical aspect that is related to this and
is relevent to today's presentation is the moral objection
of transforming nature, "such that its organic processes
and regularities and regenerative capacities are 
1 6destroyed." I have in mind the research and technology 
of miracle seeds, but this is also related to forced 
sterilization of women. These miracle seeds, produced 
by agribusiness are genetically uniform and are highly 
responsive to heavy inputs of chemical fertilization and 
irrigation. Yet, the frightening aspect of these miracle 
seeds is that the life force is removed from the seeds.
That is, the plants springing from these seeds are unable 
to reproduce themselves - the hybrids are sterile. Thus, 
the miracle in these seeds is really only a commercial 
miracle because farmers have to buy new supplies every 
y ear.
I said earlier that I would let my anger rest, yet 
now I'll let it resurface. I can only answer to the 
destruction of places, people, plants, and animals from
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deep within myself. My relationships in the world are the
source of my knowledge of the injustice of modern science.
I realize that emotions have been invalidated by the highly
rational technocratic world in which we live. The
reason/emotion duality sets up a system which values reason
while devaluing emotion. Yet, I value my emotive response.
As Turner writes: "Anger nourishes hope and fuels rebellion;
it presumes a judgment, presumes how things ought to be
and aren't, presumes a care. Emotion is still the best
1 7evidence of belief and value."
* * *
1 8
Ken: Lisa, that was beautiful. But I do have one tiny
question. Turner describes the kinds of things you are
1 8saying as 'ecobabble' , so I'll just ask his question 
- "What does it mean to communicate with a plant or a 
place?"
Lisa: Karen Warren, referring to the work of Marilyn Frye,
states that it starts with the way we view things - with
1 9a loving eye instead of an arrogant eye. It is in this 
respect that I want to ask you a question about your 
reference to Hume. Referring to him, you said that a wrong 
philosophy at worst could make you look ridiculous. I 
am thinking now about Rousseau's conception of women.
He did not look at women with a loving eye, but through 
his characterization of women justified our subordination.
I currently see the effects of his philosophy on how women 
are seen - as sexual, emotional helpmeets to serve men.
How can you say that the consequence of his wrong philosophy 
is merely ridiculous?
Ken: Lisa, if you had been listening you would have asked
a meaningful question - but what can I expect from someone
who refers to a 'loving eye' as a clear and concise
philosophical term. Anyway, in Descartes' words, "reasoning 
20makes us men" and, by extension, ridiculous reasoning
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makes us ridiculous men. But back to your presentation.
You say that part of you wants to defer to authority, in 
line with Descartes' 'masters and possessors' theme. If 
you really want to be a harmonious being, then why shouldn't 
this part of you be granted the same status as any other 
'part' of you?
Lisa: But, if I defer to authority, I also have to accept
their definition of me as a human being. I would accept
the master/slave, sado/masochistic duality on which appeals
to authority rest. According to Paul Schmidt, deferring
or sacrificing myself to authority would entail, "the
21describable traits that make a person an object." But, 
defining myself as an object is antithetical to me as a 
relational being. This is why I honestly wonder why you 
say that some of your arguments mattered when you were 
still a human being. So you're not a human being? OK, 
whatever you are, why do you blame science? I know you've 
injected mice, but I also know that you were a hunter long 
before you were a scientist. How then can you blame science 
for your dehumanization.
Ken: That's the trouble with you feminists - give you
a voice and what do you do - just substitute your own self 
bemoaned 'otherness' for another 'otherness'. So I'm not 
a human? My statement was a rhetorical implication that
20
none of us are human. Silko's description of hunting as 
ritual in Ceremony justified my hunting under your own 
ecofeminist paradigm. Besides, I quit killing years ago 
- the dreams stopped me. The dreams of all who I had 
killed. But what about your desire for a healthy 
relationship in agriculture - can you, whose father is 
a nuclear physicist, make any reasonable claim to some 
Rawlsian 'Principle of Fairness.' What makes you think 
that your agenda is any healthier than Descartes' or 
Newton's agenda?
Lisa: You ask me to justify my own agenda while
trivializing voices which I rely on in my life. Voices
found in Ceremony, ecofeminist writings, dreams, and nature.
Why can't you patriarchs stop? You imperialize others
and other ways of knowing for your own ends, raping them
of their dignity. You say that we live in a world that
we created and it only refers to us. Can't you see that
the 'we* and the 'us' refers to males with power. You
think that you have created women and nature - once
subsuming us under your radical ego and somehow setting
yourself apart. "We are women and nature. And he says
22he can not hear us speak. But we hear."
Ken: Harding was right -even the illuminated utilize
23"metaphors of gender politics." But you understand my
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argument with amazing, if irrational, clarity. Not only 
was I created and creating out of the modern project's 
conceptual charnel house - but so were you. But please, 
since my universalization of a very private pain has 
offended you so greatly, explain to me what caused your 
pain if it was not the same monster that caused mine?
Who created your self if it was not the same world that 
created mine? Or were you, like Plato's demi-urge, self 
created and are now over-flowing with sufficient goodness 
to create the rest of us?
Lisa: OK Ken - we hurt and are hurting each other. Your
acknowledgment of your own pain reminds me of your humanness
- something which I have forgotten in speaking harsh words.
Ken: And if I stand in opposition to everything then
I stand on the soil of hatred, despair, and alienation
- the very evils I oppose. Modern science, modern project, 
the radical ego - all become empty words in a world where 
people are starving. Lisa, what can we do?
Lisa: We can quit shouting at each other and start listening 
to someone who is trying to feed us.
* * *
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In November 1991, a few days before Thanksgiving, 
we visited with Nancy Matheson, a coordinator for 
Alternative Resources Organization in Helena; and with 
Bob Corbett, an architect with the National Center for 
Appropriate Technology, in Butte. A reconstruction of 
the interview with Nancy Matheson follows.
* * *
24Nancy Matheson (M): Sustainable agriculture has goals.
Among these goals are regional food self-sufficiency and 
agricultural community. To meet these goals, we will need 
to revise the role of science and technology. We supply 
the kind of information you can't get through official 
channels like county extension agents and university 
researchers. We want to reduce the dependency of farmers 
and consumers on agri-business.
Question (Q): Why? The current system seems to be providing 
a cornucopia of food.
M: Modern farming methods are not sustainable. The
inherent fertility of our soil is disappearing. Pest and
23
weed cycles can be broken up by sustainable agricultural 
methods instead of the sustained use of pesticides and 
herbicides.
Q: How does sustainable agriculture avoid the use of
chemicals?
M: We encourage an ecosystem approach, one that mimics
nature and relies on diversity.
Q: Isn't that the kind of help provided to farmers by
extension agents, Soil Conservation Service, and the 
University system?
M: The SCS has been helpful but most extension agents
and the universities use methodologies that don't relate 
to ecosystem agriculture.
Q: Then your project has met resistance?
M: The resistance from scientists is abetting, but there's
still resistance from agri-business. At first, MSU couldn't 
understand our research methods - we use case studies that 
can't be duplicated or well controlled. MSU wanted to 
help but they couldn't envision our model - they wanted 
to apply a microscope universally.
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Q: And agribusiness - how does it respond?
M: At first, they treated us as a lunatic fringe. But
now they want to work with us because they see sustainable 
agriculture as inevitable.
Q: How will you know when your project goals are being
met?
M: When extension starts doing what we're doing, then
we've been a success.
Q: Will that ever happen?
M: I hope so. We quit trying to convert people from
monoculture and increased mechanization ideologies.
Instead, we work with researchers and extension agents 
who are interested in our methods. It takes too much energy 
and time to convert institutions. When we couldn't get 
the information we needed from University Agricultural 
Science Departments, we turned to Environmental Studies 
Programs.
Q: But what about scientific developments in genetic
engineering and other pure science areas that may have 
huge significance in future agricultural projects?
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M: We see genetic engineering as a risk. Hybridization,
artificial hormones and gene splicing - all of these 
decrease genetic diversity, increase dependence on 
agribusiness, and do not use a systems approach to 
agriculture.
Q: It seems like the two models of agriculture - the
high tech, high input model and the sustainable agriculture 
modes - are incompatible. What will determine which path 
agriculture takes?
M: Federal policy. Policy now encourages chemical
dependent farming, summer fallowing, monoculture, 
centralized markets, intense mechanization and other methods 
that require a high degree of dependency on agribusiness.
Q: Who changes from traditional to sustainable farming
methods?
M: Our farmers are not conventional. They tend to have
more education, they're more thorough, and more dedicated.
Q: Why do they switch from conventional to sustainable
methods?
M: Most farmers switch to sustainable agriculture for
26
one of two reasons. The first reason is based on an 
environmental ethic. Usually, this is triggered by a 
personal experience involving pesticides or other chemicals. 
I'm not talking so much about accidents or careless 
handling, even apart from these dangers they get sick or 
their farm animals get sick and sometimes they see the 
danger to their own children.
The other reason is soil deterioration. They apply 
commercial fertilizer for a few years then notice that 
they need to use a lower gear or pull fewer blades to plow 
a field.
Fifty years ago, when records of soil composition 
began, Montana's soils averaged 3% organic matter. Now,
it averages 1 % organic. Below 1%, soil becomes 
agriculturally sterile - no matter which system - 
conventional or sustainable - is employed. Since record 
keeping began, Montana has lost 50% of its topsoil.
Q: What is the greatest threat to Montana's soil?
A: Chemical fertilizer is a bigger issue in Montana than
pesticides - they turn the soil into cement and every farmer 
notices this. But almost all farmers have had negative 
experiences with pesticides.
Q: How does AERO work?
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M: Small groups of farmers develop projects for which
we provide small grants. We're trying to nourish 
relationships 'among farmers, not tell them what to do.
We provide technical assistance and clerical support, but 
the projects are farmer driven. After the projects have 
been completed, we try to keep the networks that have been 
established intact. The networking involves farmers, local 
markets, and government agencies as well as AERO. The 
SCS is excited about sustainable agriculture.
Q: How are you funded?
M: Membership dues, donations, foundation grants, and
federal grants. The availability of research money makes 
the research itself more credible.
Q: Does agribusiness support you financially?
M: The seed companies provide some funding. Even elements
within agribusiness are beginning to realize that 
agriculture - under any method - may not be sustainable. 
Natural plant genotypes are already at risk. Soil quality 
continues to deteriorate.
Q: Are sustainable agriculture farmers succeeding
financially?
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M: They've tended to develop their own local markets
and on average do as well or better than conventional 
farmers. This regional nature of agricultural markets 
needs to be maintained.
Q: How does agribusiness respond to these local markets?
M: There was a study a few years ago called 'LISA', an
acronym for Low Input Sustainable Agriculture. The chemical 
industry ridiculed and trivialized the acronym to such 
an extent that the name was changed to, 'Sustainable 
Agriculture Research and Education.'
Q: What chance do 'Farm Improvement Clubs' and dreams
of 'community' have against agribusiness' power and money?
M: Questions about power and money are virtually
meaningless. It is critical that soil depleting activities 
are stopped.
* * *
Matheson seems to describe a science that has no 
authority, that is not universal, not replicable - in short, 
she uses the word 'science' to describe an activity that 
is antithetical to the 'rational application of method
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to test a specific hypothesis about the objective world,1 
or any other traditional definition of science.
Because of this, we will us the word 'burrowing'.
We see no precise definition of the term 'burrowing'.
Rather we see burrowing as a process ... a process of being 
enfolded by the land, a process of remembering we are of 
the earth. In burrowing intimacy with the land informs 
decisions about how to farm and about how to work with 
the land. 'Burrowing', then, denotes the recognition of 
reason in loving relationships.
Ruth Ginzburg describes midwifery in much the same 
way that Matheson describes agriculture, or Corbett 
describes energy production, or David describes quantum 
mechanics. These may not be competing paradigms, or 
extensions of old paradigms. They may be unrelated 
activities that are working within the same paradigm, 
connected only by a sharing of content in mutually exclusive 
ways. We can conceive of 'science' and conceive of 
'burrowing' simultaneously, but we cannot apply 'science' 
and 'burrowing' to the same content simultaneously.
This is a way to challenge the authority of science.
No longer is science imposed metaphorically from above.
In fact, as we said, looked at in this way, 'science' is 
no longer 'Science'. Burrowing refers to a way of 
agriculture in which people work with and listen to the 
land. Of course, in working with the land people may use
30
methods such as crop rotation or test plots. But these
methods are a tool just as a toothbrush is a tool. Our
lives are not dictated by the correct universal method
in brushing nor by the toothbrush itself.
This does reveal difficulties and paradoxes in shifting
from a 'burrow' to a 'science'. 'Test plots' and 'method'
refer to concepts inextricably woven into the 'modern
project.' Even farmers practicing 'burrowing' describe
their activities scientifically. Neil Streyer, a
Saskatchewan alternative farmer states, "it takes eight
units of energy in conventional agriculture to produce
three units of food energy - that's not sustainable. I
2 6want to balance that energy equation."
Like Matheson has stated, though, the shift must be
gradual. We can no longer be arrogant enough, or certain
enough, and we no longer have a sufficient margin of time
or land to precipitate another agricultural crisis, such
as the one she believes is linked to agribusiness.
The attitudes and relational perspectives necessary
for a burrowtific way of life are developing. Stephen
Elliot, a Victor farmer, said, "the technique I feel most
valuable is fine-tuning my observational skills. To become
27intimate with my farm." Or, as farmer Frederic
Kirschenmann said, "proposing such examples (case studies) 
is risky because the temptation may be to follow rather 
than use them as guide-lines - and that is dangerous ...
31
Each farm is unique and what works on one may not work 
28on another." AERO recognizes that 'authority' itself,
whether as science or as burrowing, is inherently dangerous.
Burrowing places goals such as soil fertility over
goals such as profit or control. No activity is separated
from the ethical, taken out of the whole fabric of our
relationships. Vandana Shiva sees conventional agriculture
as a shift, "from seeing farming as a process of nurturing
the earth to maintain her capacity to provide food, a
masculine shift takes place which sees farming as a process
2 9of generating profits."
It is in the shift back to nuturing the earth, allowing
the inherent fertility and life force to thrive, that
entails a necessary and important land ethic. Working
with the land begins by respecting the land's own processes.
Rather than the reductionist method of 'single-technology-
to-solve-a-single-problem', this land ethic presupposes
a respect for the inherent dignity, and life force of the
land. This healthy ethic is seen in the approach of many
AERO farmers who are, "creating fundamental new ways of
30working with the land." The farmers list main objectives
of conserving and protecting the soil organic matter and
soil fertility. Some farmers refuse to handle poisons
31or put them into the environment.
As for the perceived result that agribusiness has 
created huge food surpluses, Shiva quotes Dr. C. Gopalan,
32
'India's leading nutritionist': "our buffer stocks are
apparently more an indication of the poverty of our masses
32than of real food surplus." We wonder how much of this 
nation's food surplus is based on empty or malnourished 
stomachs. We wonder what the term 'food surplus' means 
if even one child is hungry.
33We also talked to Bob Corbett , an architect at the 
National Center for Appropriate Technology. NCAT's vision 
shares much with AERO. Like Nancy Matheson, Corbett sees 
'political will' as the major obstacle to 'decentralized, 
conservation oriented, and alternative energy production,' 
and corporate structures as the biggest adversary.
AERO and NCAT talk to each other. Both have quit trying 
to talk to people who will not listen to them. The needs 
are too critical to waste time and energy battling 
ideologies. Finding alternatives to freezing and starving 
is more important than proving the rightness of their 
ideology. Besides, they believe that time is running short. 
Corbett said, "we may not have the time to educate 
significant numbers of people."
When federal funds were cut and a demonstration project 
of fifty energy efficient houses was canceled by HUD, NCAT 
approached Habitat for Humanity. They are now building 
energy efficient homes with Jimmy Carter. There is poetry 
in this project - NCAT began as a dream of the Carter 
administration.
33
We know the dangers of shouting 'Fire' to a room full 
of philosophers. If you can't smell the smoke, then no 
doubt you will counter us with arguments more elegant, 
more compelling than our own. Still though, we hope that 
you will listen.
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PAPER #3
REFLECTION, DIALOGUE, INSIGHT 
EXPLORING RACISM
INTRODUCTION
The paper you are about to read has been a difficult 
one to write. It has taken me to a very hard place - a 
place of questioning myself as a person and a student of 
philosophy.
It is no coincidence that two months before receiving 
my MA in philosophy I had to write this paper. I have 
worked for many years as a philosophy student and for about 
two years as a feminist. It is with great sadness and 
understanding that I now come to the question of racism 
in the feminist movement. It is with swollen eyes that 
I begin to see similarities in the tactics of oppression 
- in the ways in which men oppress women and in the way 
white women oppress women of color.
I had a difficult time deciding on a format for this 
paper. I didn't want this to be a strictly analytic paper, 
because I thought that an analytic paper would not do 
justice to the waitings of women of color that I rely on 
extensively. I did, however, want this paper to be a 
sculpture. I wanted to piece together segments of writings 
from these women in order to show how their writing has 
led me to a clearer understanding of racist oppression.
It is their voices which I attend to and I wanted a form 
which portrayed this attention.
In the end, I decided on a dialogue. It is a contrived 
dialogue. I have selected segments of essays and literally
ii
placed them in a dialogue form. In many ways this is my 
story - a story about the way I have come to understand 
racism in my own life and feminist theory. This is a story 
which I need to understand in this time of transition in 
my life. Thus, I purposefully pulled out segments that 
had significance for me - segments that hung in my mind 
and were pressing on my consciousness. Segments which 
demanded that my vision of feminist philosophy change.
By selecting segments, I do not want to imply that 
this is all these women wrote. That would be misleading. 
Nor do I want to imply that I have come to the correct 
understanding of their words. I have interpreted their 
words and incorporated them into this paper. I realize 
that I may have misinterpreted these women and/or missed 
their point. I feel vulnerable about this because I see 
how white privileged women do not always listen to women 
of color and therefore I may not have really understood 
their meaning. I acknowledge this and stand open to 
criticism. I stand willing to work on communication, to 
work on listening. As I say in the paper, I am not willing 
to protect my ignorance at the expense of another person's 
well-being. In light of my blurred interpretation, I 
encourage readers to read the sources I used. They are 
listed under 'sources'.
Finally, I encourage readers of this paper to think 
about process. I want you to think about how you interpret
iii
other people's stories, about how you interpret a 
philosophical argument or a novel. Think about how these 
stories are incorporated into your own life and work.
It is an interesting process - one which deserves careful 
thought. One which I am exploring now.
iv

In 1960 Betty Friedan published the Feminine Mystique. 
This booked marked the beginning of what many people deem 
the second wave of feminism. While this second wave was 
similar to the first (1846-1920) in that it strove for 
political and civil rights for women, it is distinguished 
by the huge amount of theory generated. This theory-making 
grew out of consciousness-raising groups and focused around 
such questions as sex/gender distinctions, socialization 
of men and women, rape, unpaid labor, and other social 
issues.
All this theory-making is an attempt by women to 
articulate our own experiences. No longer willing to accept 
the definitions placed upon us, women are striving to define 
ourselves. We are recovering a lost history. We are 
striving to articulate our lives systematically in order 
to allow ourselves the freedom to explore who we are as 
women and to make sense of our future as women. Women 
are taking our experiences as women seriously.
Maria Lugones: "But you theorize about women, and 
we are women, so you understand yourselves to be theorizing 
about us and we understand you to be theorizing about us.
Yet none of the feminist theories developed so far seem 
to me to help Hispanas in the articulation of our 
experience. We have a sense that in using them we are 
distorting our experiences. Most Hispanas can not even 
understand the language used in these theories - and only
1
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in some cases the reason is that the Hispana can not 
understand English. We do not recognize ourselves in these 
theories. They create in us a schizophrenic split between 
our concern for ourselves as women and ourselves as 
Hispanas, one that we do not feel otherwise. Thus they 
seem to us to force us to assimilate to some vision of 
Anglo culture, however revised that version may be. They 
seem to ask that we leave our communities or that we become 
alienated so completely in them that we feel hollow."
Lisa Gerber: When I read these words of Maria Lugones,
I think of many things. I think of how I felt when I 
realized that I had been excluded from theory. For me, 
this was especially true of ethical theory. I was not 
the kind of person who was being defined for me. I was 
not the Kantian super-rational individual, nor the 
calculating utilitarian. I felt crazy in trying to approach 
ethical problems in a way that did not fit my experience 
or myself. The philosophical definition of person did 
not coincide with my self definition.
I finally felt that my experience and my 
self-conception was being explored when I began studying 
feminist theory two years ago. No longer did I feel that 
my approach to ethical dilemmas was deviant, but I felt 
validated in contextualizing situations and lives. I keep 
using ethical theory as an example, but I have similar 
experiences in comparing traditional theory with feminist
3
theory.
Yet, I hear Maria Lugones saying that this feminist 
theory, which has been so liberating for me, has silenced 
her. It is hard for me to comprehend how feminist theory 
after breaking generations of silence has then turned around 
and silenced others. I hear her saying that Anglo women 
have created this feminist theory and it is exclusive.
Elizabeth Spelman: "It is only possible for a woman 
who does not feel highly vulnerable with respect to other 
parts of her identity, e.g. race, class, ethnicity, 
religion, sexual alliance, etc., to conceive of her voice 
simple and essentially as a 'woman's voice'."
Lisa: That is interesting and insightful. What I 
hear Spelman saying is that gender is the most, if not 
only, vulnerable factor of an Anglo, affluent, heterosexual 
women living in a sexist, racist, elitist, homophobic 
culture. So these women, women like myself, focused on 
the problem which they wanted to change - the fact that 
gender makes us vulnerable in a sexist society. So in 
the consciousness-raising groups and in theory, white 
privileged women attempted to drop the definition placed 
upon them by patriarchy and stove to articulated who they 
were as women. 'Woman' was what theory was focused upon, 
not what is my experience as a white, heterosexual, affluent 
woman. 'Woman' was thus being defined by a select group 
of women and universalized to include all women.
4
Yet, as Lugones points out this creates a split in 
her. She feels divided as a Hispana and as a women. Our 
theories attempt to split her being. As Anglo women, I 
do not see how we can recognize how this universalizing 
has hurt us and then turn around and use this oppressive 
tactic upon other women. Not only does this delegitimize 
our feminist theories, but more importantly, this type 
of oppression hurts people. It is imperative to realize 
that being a woman is not experienced essentially; that 
my experience in being a woman is intimately connected 
with the fact that I am white among other things. This 
aspect is integral to who I am and how I experience the 
world. To ignore this difference as clouding the essential 
women and to assume that gender is the only important 
difference among people is racist. This is a tactic of 
an oppressor.
Maria: "I think it necessary to explain why in so 
many cases when women of color appear in front of 
white/Anglo women to talk about feminism and women of color, 
we mainly raise a complaint; the complaint of exclusion, 
of silencing, of being included in a universe we have not 
chosen. We usually raise the complaint with a certain 
amount of disguised or undisguised anger."
Lisa: I understand this anger. This exclusion from 
theory and theorizing, this forcing into an unchosen world, 
this silencing of experience is a well known patriarchal
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tool. As a white woman, I know the harm in being excluded 
from history. I have felt the pain in being defined by 
someone else. I have felt confusion in trying to understand 
traditional ethical theory when it did not coincide with 
my experience or views on life. I remember the hurt and 
anger I felt when I realized sayings like "all men are 
created equal" referred only to men and not all people.
And now. And now I hear women of color saying that they 
are being excluded. I hear them saying that white feminists 
speak about 'women', but in reality are only referring 
to white women. I imagine, though I am not sure, that 
there may be a greater sense of betrayal, a greater sense 
of exclusion, when women exclude other women.
I understand that white women when they universalize 
are acting as oppressors. I must ask, in the same vein 
as I have asked male theorists, what entitles me to speak 
for all women. To say I know 'woman', essentially and 
definitively, is a form of power over. Who gives me the 
power and authority to define woman? At first it seems 
appropriate since I am a woman. But, as it has been made 
crystal clear, I say women, but I mean a particular group 
of women. And so it fits. Oppressive tactics are varied 
and deep. I have been excluded from the category human 
for the best part of 2000 years, and now I am excluding 
my sisters. This pains me. I hope that I can act on the 
lessons I have learned. I have learned the importance
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of people defining themselves, rather than being defined 
by someone else.
Blanche Jackson: "When human beings group themselves 
and claim an identity, they are entering into an experiment, 
a contractual agreement, to generate a body of information 
on a set of evolving relationships. In doing this work, 
women of color do not welcome the uninvited input of white 
feminists who project the attitude that their truth is 
every woman's truth, that they created feminism and that 
they will guide minorities to the light."
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Amoja Three Rivers: "Ethnocentricism, according to 
the Random House Dictionary of the English Language means 
'a tendency to view alien groups or cultures in terms of 
one's own' and 'the belief in the inherent superiority 
of one's own group and culture, accompanied by a feeling 
of contempt for other groups and cultures.' It is 
ethnocentric to use a generic term such as people to refer 
only to white people and then racially label everyone else. 
This creates and reinforces the assumption that white people 
are the norm and that all others are aberrations and somehow 
less than truly human. It is seeing white people at the 
center and everyone else as variations on the theme."
Lisa: It is ethnocentric for me to speak of women 
(as I have in many papers) when I am conceptualizing the 
lives of white privleged women. I don't know how many 
times one of my professors asked who is the 'we' you write 
about in this paper. Not understanding, I would then write, 
'we, as women.' I do not think that my experience is a 
rare occurrence in theoretical writing. Sadly and 
ironically many Anglo feminists have challenged the 
patriarchy because of its androcentricism while failing 
to look at their own ethnocentric biases.
bell hooks: "One reason white women active in feminist 
movement were unwilling to confront racism was their 
arrogant assumption that their call for Sisterhood was 
a non-racist gesture. Many white women have said to me,
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'we wanted black women and other non-white women to join 
the movement' totally unaware of their perception that 
they somehow 'own' the movement, that they are the 'hosts' 
inviting us as 'guests'."
Lisa: I do think it is ethnocentricism that leads 
to this arrogant assumption of which bell hooks writes.
This is part of seeing white people at the center and 
everyone else as variations on the theme. This 
ethnocentricism makes it possible for white people to think 
we own the feminist movement. I've seen this in 
organizations that I belong to. At the University Women's 
Center we often speak about the need for more diversity. 
Recognizing this need we try to recruit more women of color 
by placing our posters in different parts of campus and 
working with other groups. And still we are a group of 
mostly white women. Betty, the sole black women in our 
organization said that she has invited members of the Black 
Student Unions to our meetings. No, they replied, that 
is a white women's group.
I understand what bell hooks is saying. As long as 
it is white women trying to figure out how to get women 
of color to join, there is going to be a problem. It is 
saying that this is our group and the way we want to define 
it is diverse. What needs to happen if it is to be 
multiracial instead of racist is that we need to activate 
together. Diverse women need to begin groups together
9
and to develop goals and values together. This is a process 
which needs to be addressed. One step in this process 
is dropping the tool of ethnocentricism which allows white 
feminists to assume that they have created women's culture 
and women's groups. It is to drop the ethnocentricism 
which allows white feminists to assume that their goals 
and values are right and other women's goals and values 
should be molded to fit them.
I think this ethnocentricism is damaging in at least 
three important ways. First, it allows for the exploitation 
of other cultures. Second, it can lead to a
misunderstanding and devaluation of nonwhite women's history 
and experience. Thirdly, ethnocentricism can harm women 
when their histories and experiences are not taken 
seriously. When I acknowledge the way ethnocentricism 
can damage I am acknowledging that it is a tool of an 
oppressor; the ethnocentic world view is used, implicitly 
or explicitly, to justify harm to other cultures.
Amoja: "Let's face a hard reality: 20th century white 
society is culturally addicted to exploitation. Cultivate 
an awareness of your own personal motivations. Do not 
simply take and consume. If you are white and you find 
yourself drawn to Native American spirituality, Middle 
Eastern religion, African drumming, Asian philosophies, 
or Latin rhythms, make some effort to maintain some kind 
of balance. Don't learn the fun and exciting things about
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us and then go home to your safe, isolated, white, 
privileged life. Learn about the history of the people 
whose culture you are dabbling in. Learn how your history 
relates to our own, how your privilege relates and 
contributes to our oppression and exploitation. And most 
importantly - give something back."
Lisa: I think the exploitation of other cultures can 
be obvious as well as subtle. I am bothered when I hear, 
one professor try to justify animal rights by appealing 
to part of Chinese philosophy. I am bothered when 
environmental ethicists talk about Native American tradition 
without giving voice to the differences in tribes or various 
people. I think theorymaking is especially vulnerable 
to these types of exploitation. The philosopher and the 
anthropologist, the historian and the biographer, justify 
their exploitation because they are on the search for truth.
I hear Three Rivers when she speaks about learning 
history. There is much historical interaction that I have 
not taken the time to learn. I have always wondered about 
the relationship between white southern plantation owners 
wives and black women slaves. Maxine Van de Wetering began 
a story which she never ended. She spoke about how southern 
white women were supposed to be virtuous, practically 
bodiless, but they were still expected to lay with their 
husbands. Most likely, the wife was raped. These plantation 
owners also had a history of raping black slave women.
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These men would take a special liking to certain black 
women who they raped and would make them work in the house, 
usually as an attendant to the wife. So there they were.
Two women, both raped by the same man, yet living out an 
oppressive relationship - one mistress, one slave. Was 
there hatred, jealousy, tension, empathy. What is the story?
I am also wondering about what Three Rivers says about 
giving something back. In this paper, I am taking the 
words of women, but am I giving anything back? I have 
been so well trained to take, I am not sure what to offer.
Amoja: "It is important that European women not assume 
with ethnocentricism that their herstorical experiences 
are universal. They should not assume that no group of 
women any where could possibly have had 'rooms of their 
own' or input into shaping how their people moved in the 
world."
Lisa: These words of Amoja Three Rivers sink into 
my heart. Anglo-European feminists have long maintained 
that males have been the creators of culture and women 
have been defined as helpmeets to male needs. Anglo 
feminists have hailed the writing of Virginia Woolf in 
her insight that women need rooms of our own, real space 
and resources, in order to be creative. I hear Three Rivers 
saying that while this may be true for Anglo culture, it 
doesn't necessarily mean that it is true for all cultures.
I am feeling really uncomfortable right now. I think
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about how I am using the writing of these women to my own 
ends - in the exploration of how feminist theory is racist. 
This is my story. Perhaps I am so preoccupied with this, 
that I haven't really listened to these women. I have 
a feeling that I am distorting their words to suit my needs.
So when I hear Three Rivers suggest that maybe not 
all women have not had 'rooms of their own', nor input 
into shaping their culture, I stop. I see clearly the 
narrow vision I am following. I look sideways into the 
recesses of my mind. There tucked into a corner are stories 
I have heard. Stories about strong Pueblo women. These 
women designed adobes and the layout of the pueblo. They 
commanded great respect and made decisions which affected 
to whole community. When white traders first came, these 
Pueblo women continued in their role as spokeswomen. Yet, 
these white traders would not talk with the women. They 
wanted to trade with other men.
I am not sure where I heard this story and I am not 
sure if this is the type of story that Three Rivers is 
suggesting. I am sure however that I need to listen more 
carefully to the voices of other women. I must quiet 
myself... listen... allow other women the space to 
articulate their story. Stories not born out of Anglo 
culture.
Again, I hear women of color continuing to point out 
that white women's experiences are not definitive of all
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women's experiences. To assume that white culture is the 
norm caused the distortion of many women's experiences.
Gail Burstyn: Another issue for me as I listened to 
my supervisor describe my career plans was my fear of taking 
up space. Of seeming too obvious or overpowering. This 
is a tricky issue and feels incredibly risky to write about. 
My fear is based upon the stereotype that Jews are loud, 
obvious, and pushy. As part of my internalized 
anti-semitism, I try to disassociate from this negative 
stereotype. Yet this stereotype is rooted in some 
particular feature of Jewish culture which I do not consider 
negative. Many of my Jewish peers grew up as I did in 
homes where debates and discussions were common mealtime 
and anytime activities. We were encourage to open our 
mouths and speak up. 'Don't talk back' and 'children should 
be seen and not heard' were not sayings in my household.
We were not raised to be docile or compliant. So, as Jews, 
we sometimes stand out because of this upbringing and as 
Jewish women, we may seem even more unlike our non-Jewish 
colleagues, who may not have been raised to be so 
assertive."
Lisa: I can empathize with Gail Burstyn and admire 
her strength in speaking about her truth as a Jewish woman.
I have a sense that she is reclaiming an identity from 
the jaws of a negative stereotype. I too have done this.
I have reclaimed my emotions and intuitions which have
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been negatively stereotyped by the patriarchy. I am doing 
this against great resistance.
Yet, Gail Burstyn is referring to a conference in 
which she and other women gathered around the issue of 
domestic violence. I wonder how the woman's movement 
perpetuates stereotypes. Do feminists really make a space 
for difference? I say this with my new understanding of 
how white affluent women, usually of Christian heritage, 
have claimed ownership of the feminist movement. These 
Anglo women historically have been prescribed meekness.
It may be that we play out these historical images. In 
the feminist collective to which I belong, many of us work 
to speak our minds directly and honestly. It is something 
which had to be learned, and it is a practice which is 
not always easy.
Perhaps deep inside we fear assertive behavior. In 
white Christian culture, women have been rewarded for 
manipulative behavior. My own mother, who is incredibly 
strong and clear sighted, says that she has perfected the 
tactic of getting what she wants by making my dad believe 
that he thought of it. So perhaps when we Anglo women 
see a strong woman like Gail, we see all the doors which 
have been shut on us when we directly speak our mind.
I hear Gail when she says that her assertive behavior 
is rooted in part of Jewish culture which she sees as 
positive. I think that it is crucial that we honor each
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other and each other's strength and leadership. I also 
think that a lot of self-reflection needs to go on; self 
reflection on a personal level and self-reflection on a 
social, political level. Without this reflection, serious 
harm can occur.
Donna Alhadeff Messinger and Haley Seif: "While Task 
Force members understand and value making the various Task 
Forces visible, having Jewish women wear light blue stickers 
to achieve this goal was inappropriate. Many of us were 
disturbed and angered by being put into a position of 
wearing the light blue stickers. Many Jewish women refused 
to wear these stickers while others of us wore them, having 
serious reservations about doing so. We are a diverse 
group of Jewish women. Some of us are Holocaust survivors. 
Some of us are daughters and granddaughters of Holocaust 
survivors. Nazi soldiers and citizens of Nazi-occupied 
Europe killed many of our family members and/or allowed 
them to be killed. Those nations, following official German 
policies, required Jews to wear yellow stars at all times. 
Our people were denied civil rights and eventually denied 
rights to live at all. The thought of wearing color coded 
stickers brought up images of the Holocaust for some of 
us. We, too, would like to be visible within the Battered 
Women's Movement. The option of wearing light blue 
stickers, however, ignored our oppression. As a Task Force, 
we would like to choose a symbol that affirms and empowers
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our people."
Lisa: Listening to Messinger and Seif, I can see why 
the feminist movement must be interconnected and 
multicultural if oppression is going to be fought in any 
revolutionary manner.
Amoja: "Nor should [European women] decide that 
'multicultural" means that they get to take what they want 
and give us what they think we should have. Perhaps instead 
of our music and spirituality, women of color would like 
to contribute our notions of respect."
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Audre: "Women of today are still being called upon 
to stretch across the gap of male ignorance and to educate 
men as to our experiences and our needs. This is an old 
and primary tool of all oppressors to keep the oppressed 
occupied with the master's concerns. Now we hear that 
it is the task of women of Color to educate white women 
- in the face of tremendous resistance - as to our 
existence, our difference, our relative roles in our joint 
survival. This is a diversion of energies and a tragic 
repetition of racist patriarchal thought."
Lisa: I have noticed this oppressive tactic in dealing 
with the male power structure. This tactic is especially 
useful in maintaining the existent power structure for 
two reasons. First, it requires a constant drain of energy; 
energy which could be better spent elsewhere. Second, 
it allows for an evasion of responsibility on the part 
of the oppressor.
Now I hear and I understand that white women are 
placing the responsibility of education upon women of color 
and thus are using the same oppressive tactic. I see how 
the burden is wrongfully placed upon women of color. I 
have often heard that we can not speak about racism unless 
there are women of color present. Women of color are sought 
to be on panels on racism. Black women are asked to go 
into classrooms and explain the importance of Martin Luther 
King and the civil rights movement. Indian women are told
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they must share their spirituality. And it is said that 
women of color must educate on racism.
Amoja: "The closest I have come to doing any real 
antiracism work is giving workshops on the background and 
cultural perspective of the Cultural Etiquette guide in 
which I talk women's herstory. I think that gives women 
some fuel with which to combat racism and internalized 
oppression. But as far as doing antiracism work directly,
I don't because I find it too painful. I try to encourage 
white women to do this work among their sisters."
Lisa: I know how painful it is to speak with men about 
sexism. I think of the blank faces. Or the questions 
which are condesendingly asked. I hate the way I am asked 
for 'proof' when I felt the painful truth in the telling 
of my story. By analogy and because I understand what 
these women are saying, I see how hurtful it is to ask 
a woman of color to educate me about racism.
Audre: "this letter (to Mary Daly) attempts to break 
a silence which I had imposed upon myself ... I had decided 
never again to speak to a white woman about racism. I 
felt it was wasted energy because of destructive guilt 
and defensiveness and because whatever I had to say might 
be better said by white women to one another at far less 
emotional cost to the speaker and probably with a better 
hearing."
Lisa: I honor the strength of Audre Lorde and Amoja
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Three Rivers. Their clarity in not educating white women 
about racism and not participating in a relationship 
dictated by an oppressor makes me determined to subvert 
the other part of the unhealthy power relation; I will 
take responsibility for my own actions and my own education. 
I say this while acknowledging and being grateful for all 
I have learned from the women whose words appear in this 
paper.
One way for Anglo women to take responsibility for 
eliminating their ethnocentricism and their racism is 
learning about women and the cultures to which they belong. 
One way to do this is to read books by women of color.
In this way we can educate ourselves about other ways of 
being in the world, other holidays, other values, other 
ways of seeing racism and sexism.
Maxine Hong Kingston: "And again whammed into the 
block question: does he announce now that the author is
- Chinese? Or, rather, Chinese-American: And be forced 
into autobiographical confession. Stop the music - I have 
to butt in and introduce myself and my race. 'Dear reader, 
all these characters whom you've been identifying with
- Bill, Brooke, and Annie - are Chinese - and I am too.'
The fiction is spoiled. You who have been suckered along, 
identifying like hell, only to find out that you've been 
getting a peculiar, colored, slanted p.o.v. 'Call me 
Ismael." See? You pictured a white guy didn't you? If
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Ismael were described - ochery ecru amber umber skin - 
you picture a tan white guy didn't you? Wittman wanted 
to spoil all those stories coming out of and set in New 
England Back East - to blacken and to yellow Bill, Brooke, 
and Annie. A new rule for the imagination: The common 
man has Chinese looks. From now on, whenever you read 
about those people with no surnames, color them with black 
or yellow skin." -from The Tripmaster Monkey: His Fake 
Book.
Lisa: Ah, and we must always be aware of how we remake 
others in our image. This passage from Kingston's novel 
made a great impact on me. I think about it often and 
ask other white women about if they see white characters 
when they read. Many replied yes, unless they knew the 
cultures intimately. So another way of educating ourselves 
might involve making a good faith effort to get to know 
different women and educate ourselves about their cultures.
Andy Smith: "When white 'feminists' see how white 
people have historically oppressed others and how they 
are coming very close to destroying the earth, they often 
want to disassociate themselves from their whiteness.
They do this by opting to 'become Indian.' In this way 
they can escape responsibility and accountability for white 
racism.
Of course white 'feminists' only want to become only 
partly Indian. They do not want to be part of our struggles
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for survival against genocide, and they do not want to 
fight for treaty rights or an end to substance abuse or 
sterilization abuse. They do not want to do anything that 
would tarnish their romanticized notions of what it means 
to be Indian."
Lisa: What I hear Andy Smith saying is that getting 
to know other cultures does not mean exploitation or 
colonization. No, educating oneself about other cultures 
is part of a process of engaging in mutual and respectful 
dialogue.
Maria: "Here we should again note that white/Anglo 
women are much less prepared for this dialogue with women 
of color than women of color are for dialogue with them 
in that women of color have had to learn white/Anglo ways, 
self-conceptions, and conceptions of them."
Lisa: White women have not had to learn the ways of 
women of color in order to survive. In a white supremacist 
society, white people get a free ride because of the color 
of our skin. A free ride built upon the lives of other 
people.
Maria: "The only real motive that makes sense to me 
for your joining this investigation is the motive of 
friendship, out of friendship. A non-imperialist feminism 
reguires that you make a real space for our articulating, 
interpreting, theorizing and reflecting about the 
connections among them - a real space must be noncoerced
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space - and/or that you follow us into our world out of 
friendship. I see the 'out of friendship' as the only 
sensical motivation for this following because the task 
at hand for you is one of extraordinary difficulty. It 
requires that you be willing to suffer alienation and 
self-disruption."
Lisa: Wait. I am feeling uncomfortable again. I
have reached another insight in the writing of this paper. 
When I first began this project, I wanted to use extensive 
quotes from women of color, because I wished to respect 
their voices. But, what is happening here is not noncoerced 
space. It does not get much more coerced than this. And 
I haven't felt that I have offered a space for them to 
articulate their experience. No, I have taken their words 
and put them in a space where they will support my thesis.
I have not followed a woman of color into her world, but 
dismembered her words and drug them into my world of theory.
So now I have a strong criticism of this particular 
paper, but I feel that this critiques goes deeper than 
that. After the writing of the first draft I went into 
a deep depression. I was hurt because I had come to see 
ways in which the feminist movement was oppressive. I 
was also hurt by the form of the paper. I had this feeling 
that I could never do philosophy again. I thought that 
I had misused and misinterpreted the words of these women. 
Yet, in a strange sort of way, I felt like the way I had
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set up this paper was more honest than traditional theory. 
Longer quotes would allow readers a stronger sense of what 
these women were saying and would allow readers to see 
how I interacted with their material. So there is this 
tension. Tension between honoring the voices of other 
women and exploiting them.
This tension allowed me to see how traditional theory 
is exploitative. How many times have we said, "according 
to .." or "as so and so says in her book..". Who is to 
say that our interpretation of other texts is correct. 
Somehow we philosophers appeal to other's writings and 
assume that we have the correct translation. Yet, very 
often, we choose only part of a text and many times we 
misinterpret it.
The reading of texts has come to be so solid. One 
can read and reread an essay until one gets to the point 
that she thinks she has found the correct translation.
Then she takes this gem of truth and takes it to her own 
work and incorporates it. But, we must remember that we 
come with our selves, with our own experiences, our own 
needs, and our own methods of translating and interpreting. 
Acknowledging this may mean honest theory.
I am beginning to understand that theory can be done 
differently. I feel motivated to work through a blurring 
of boundaries. I want to dissolve the philosophical lining 
so it can mingle with prose and with poetry. I want to
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do philosophy in a way than I am completely embedded in 
it. I want to take those noble questions, questions of 
what it is to be a human being, of what it means to act 
ethically, of beauty, and explore them from my concrete 
life. The writing of this paper has led me to understand 
that what I really want to speak about in the discussion 
of racism is listening. I want to explore the personal, 
political and social barriers that get in the way of 
listening. I want to write about the virtue of listening.
That however is another essay. We must continue and 
think through two more sections of oppressive tactics.
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Lisa: Emotions have been an important source of 
knowledge for feminists. Many feminists have argued that 
rationality is not the sole epistemological tool and that 
emotions are an important source of knowledge. I have 
often argued that emotions are not only a source of 
knowledge, but are bonds which hold us together. That 
is, emotions allow me to connect with others - with humans, 
trees, birds, the Clark Fork River.
Audre: "Women responding to racism. My response to 
racism is anger. I have lived with that anger, ignoring 
it, feeding upon it, learning to use it before it laid 
my vision to waste, for most of my life. Once I did it 
in silence, afraid of the weight. My fear of anger taught 
me nothing. Your fear of anger will teach you nothing 
also.
Women responding to racism means women responding 
to anger: the anger of exclusion, of unquestioned privilege, 
of racial distortions, of silence, ill-use, stereotyping, 
defensiveness, misnaming, betrayal, and co-option."
Lisa: Anger. I have thought much about anger. 
Historically, I see how European women have been taught 
not to be angry. I think about the story of patient 
Griselda. Griselda is a dutiful wife who never gets angry. 
She is put through many trials by her demented husband 
including the supposed killing of her children, yet she 
always complies with cheerfulness. She is completely
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devoted to obedience and delights in nothing but her 
husband's pleasure. This is a story written in the early 
seventeenth century, and yet this prescription still holds 
true today. How often are Anglo women told to smile or 
that they look ugly when they are angry.
Yet, even with all this cultural baggage, I have 
learned to value my anger. I have learned to listen to 
this anger and to express it. I know that anger is an 
appropriate response to the fact that one out of every 
three women will be raped in their lifetime. I know that 
my anger at the acres and acres of clearcut in Pattee Canyon 
is an appropriate response. Anger is not a still emotion.
It necessitates change. My anger has been a motive force 
for activism. This anger spotlights a better vision, a 
healthier way of envisioning relationships among people 
and between people and the world.
Audre: "For women raised to fear, too often anger 
threatens annihilation. In the male construct of brute 
force, we were taught that our lives depended upon the 
good will of patriarchal power. The anger of others was 
to be avoided at all costs, because there was nothing to 
be learned from it but pain, a judgment that we had been 
bad girls, come up lacking, not done what we were supposed 
to do. And if we accept our powerlessness, then of course 
any anger can destroy us."
Lisa: I hear you Audre Lorde. I have been taught
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to express anger, but I have never learned to respond to 
someone's anger. I remember at the first feminist 
conference I went to the poet Chrystos was there. She 
was angry. She said she was angry because she had been 
invited to read at a conference on race, class and gender, 
but as she stood up to read, she spoke to a group of mostly 
white faces. She said she was angry because she felt 
tokenized. She was angry because of the lack of Native 
American women attending the conference. She was angry, 
and yes I felt like a bad girl, like I had done something 
wrong. X felt guilty. Guilty for participating in a racist 
institution. Guilty for being white.
Audre: "I have no creative use for guilt, yours or 
my own. Guilt is only another way of avoiding informed 
action, of buying time out of the pressing need to make 
clear choices, out of the approaching storm that can feed 
the earth as well as bend the trees."
Lisa: That is interesting. I was raised a Catholic 
and Catholics are taught that when you feel guilty you 
go to confession. You sit in a dark booth and tell the 
priest your 'sins'. The priest then gives you a certain 
number of Hail Mary's to say and your sin, and subsequent 
guilt, is absolved. Yet the problem is never confronted 
directly.
I come from New Mexico. This state has a 
rehabilitation home for priests who have gone astray.
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Many times I have driven past this ranchette and thought 
of all the alcoholic priests who wandered the grounds.
I imagined they had all nipped a little too often on the 
blood of Christ. And yet last week I found out that this 
center also housed priests who molested children. The 
place isn't funny to me any longer. The child molesters 
roam around the beautiful New Mexico landscape and pray 
for their healing. After enough Christian prayer they 
would be reinstituted into the church, most of them staying 
in New Mexico. Their prayer did not confront the problem. 
Their prayer did not help the many New Mexican children 
were sexually abused by these men.
Audre: "Guilt is not a response to anger; it is a 
response to ones' own actions or lack of action. If it 
leads to change then it can be useful, since then it is 
no longer guilt but the beginning of knowledge. Yet all 
too often, guilt is just another name for impotence, for 
defensiveness destructive of communication; it becomes 
a device to protect ignorance and the continuation of things 
the way they are, the ultimate protection for 
changelessness."
Lisa: I see how guilt is not an appropriate response 
to anger. I refuse to protect my ignorance at the expense 
of another woman's well-being. I see how guilt is the 
perfect tool of an oppressor who does not want to change; 
who does not want to change herself or society.
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It's funny, I had a whole list of fears about standing 
in front of another woman's anger. I feared that I would 
respond with anger and we would not communicate, but hate.
I feared that I would be unable to hear your pain, 
especially if it was pain to which I had contributed. 
Perhaps I feared the dissolution of that part of myself 
which stands upon the false pedestal of a racist society.
No matter. Those fears are but memories. I stand open 
and ready to listen.
Audre: "It is not the anger of other women that will 
destroy us but our own refusals to stand still, to listen 
to its rhythms, to learn within it, to move beyond the 
manner of presentation to the substance, to tap that anger 
as an important source of empowerment."
SA/wewss
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bell: "According to their [bourgeois women 
liberationists] analysis, the basis for bonding was shared 
victimization, hence the emphasis on common oppression.
The concept of bonding directly reflects male supremacist 
thinking. Sexist ideology teaches women that to be female 
is to be a victim."
Lisa: Yes, I see that. Historically, the common 
oppression of women was emphasized. Feminists looked at 
ways in which women were defined by the male culture and 
then looked at the ways in which this definition set women 
up for abuse. For example, one image of woman is the whore. 
This woman is promiscuous, and always wants sex; she is 
threatening to men, because she could lure even the purist 
of men to their sensual destruction. She was the siren.
She was nature attempting to cause men to fall from their 
spiritual sky. She was the vagina dentata. She was the 
woman next door who could not call it rape, because she, 
like all women, really wanted it. She was a victim. A 
victim because she had been defined in such a way that 
her abuse was not seen as abuse.
So yes, in the feminist movement women have been 
defined by their common oppression. Yet, I think there 
is more than sexist ideology working in the idea of common 
oppression. X think it comes from the focus upon 
commonality or sameness. I further think that this search 
for sameness is another tactic of an oppressor. Think
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about how America has been defined as the great melting 
pot where differences melt away and where every man has 
the chance at the American dream. Or think about how moral 
worth has been accorded to people having a common feature 
- like Kant's notion of rationality for instance. Or think 
about the traditional notion of marriage. Two people are 
united as one under a common surname. Or think about how 
we do theory.
This striving for commonality was seen in the first 
part of this piece during the discussion about how white 
feminists were universalizing their own particular notion 
of woman. We searched for a common feature, a common 
essence which would unite all women. This example refers 
to the content of theory. The theoretical method also 
emphasizes sameness. As a student, I have been told to 
think for myself, but I am told to couch it in ways that 
are nonpersonal and objective. Theory all follows the 
same form. One has a thesis and then one gives reasons 
and authoritative quotes to support this thesis. What 
I have found after five years of philosophy is that this 
sameness in the guise of objectivity has silenced my voice 
and trained me to exploit the voices of others.
Audre: "Simone de Beauvoir once said: 'it is in the 
knowledge of the genuine conditions of our lives that we 
must draw our strength to live and our reasons for acting.'
Racism and homophobia are real conditions in all our
32
lives in this place and time. I urge each one of us here 
to reach down into that deep place of knowledge inside 
herself and touch that terror and loathing of any difference 
that lives there. See whose face it wears. Then the 
personal as the political can begin to illuminate all our 
choices."
Lisa: There are many differences which are not now 
acknowledged in a revolutionary manner by white feminists.
I say revolutionary manner, because difference is 
acknowledged in a very superficial way. I don't know how 
often I have read essays which speak about women and say 
something about how we must, of course, take into account 
differences in race, class, sexual preference, age, etc.
This is not a way of honoring difference, but merely a 
way of moving our lips.
Audre: "Poor women and women of color know that there 
is a difference between the daily manifestations of marital 
slavery and prostitution because it is our daughters who 
line 42nd Street. If white American feminist theory need 
not deal with the differences in our oppression, then how 
do you deal with the fact that the women who clean your 
houses and tend your children while you attend conferences 
on feminist theory are, for the most part, poor women and 
women of color? What is the theory behind feminist racism."
Lisa: One of the reasons why Anglo women fear to look 
at difference is because as in the case above, we will
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have to acknowledge our role in oppressing others. In 
addition, we will have to look at our own lives and change 
those aspects which are oppressive and harmful to others.
We will also have to look into ourselves to see how we 
judge difference, and explore the reasons why we think 
we are justified in oppressing others.
This devaluation of difference and legitimizing of 
oppression because of those differences is a construct 
of an oppressive group. There is a close relationship 
between this, methods of assimilation, and the idea that 
white feminists own the feminist movement. After all if 
I and others like me own the feminist movement, then I 
and others like me dictate norms and values. If you want 
to take part in this movement, you will do so in terms 
of attributes we share as women. Regarding our differences, 
I can ignore them, devalue them, or appropriate them for 
my purposes.
If I see another woman solely in terms of ways in 
which she is like me, then I negate much of her being.
It hurts me to think about this, but what if I thought 
that the only significant aspect of Audre Lorde was that 
she was a woman? What has happened to the description 
of herself as a black lesbian mother of two and member 
of an interracial couple?
Audre: "...I believe one of the reasons white women 
have such difficulty reading Black women's work is because
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of their reluctance to see Black women as women and as 
different from themselves. To examine Black women's 
literature effectively requires that we be seen as whole 
people in our actual complexities - as individuals, as 
women, as human - rather than as one of those problematic 
but familiar stereotypes provided in this society in place 
of genuine images of Black women. And I believe this holds 
true for the literature of other women of Color who are 
not black."
Lisa: I recognize that tactic. It comes back to being 
defined as an Other rather than defining oneself. As long 
as a person is defined as Other all types of abuse are 
not seen as abuse at all. I can not see the harm that 
my theorizing does to women of color unless I see nonwhite 
women as dynamic complete individuals. Unless I listen 
to and hear the self descriptions of women of color then 
I will be condoning the existent power structure. I will 
be supporting and continuing the very structure which 
oppresses based on difference.
Audre: "Now we must recognize difference among women 
who are our equals, neither inferior nor superior, and 
devise ways to use each other's difference to enrich our 
visions and our joint struggles.
The future of our earth may depend upon the ability 
of all women to identify and develop new definitions of 
power and new patterns of relating across difference.
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The old definitions have not served us not the earth that 
supports us. The old pattern, no matter how cleverly 
rearranged to imitate progress, still condemns us to 
cosmetically altered repetitions of the same old exchanges.
Lisa: I do think there are healthy ways of relating 
across differences. Right now I want to explore the concept 
of difference in my work. I think there are two things 
that are happening here. One is that differences between 
people must be recognized and honored. Two is that 
difference needs to be recognized in the method of theory. 
For me this realization is a symbol of freedom. No longer 
do I feel bound by traditional theoretical shackles. I 
am also excited about listening to how other women do 
theory, when they are given the space to do it freely.
How a woman does theory will add to the expression of who 
she is. Theory is the creation and articulation of an 
idea - an expression of how one sees the world. If we 
honor difference in living one's life, we must also honor 
difference in the articulation of life.
One question keeps running through my mind: can diverse 
women do theory together? This is an interesting question 
and I hear hope in the asking. The way I see it is that 
if we can reject (as our only alternative) the traditional 
notion of theory, then the possibilities of theoretical 
discourse blossom. I think it will be an interesting 
process when diverse women do theory together. The form
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of theory will need to be created by the women themselves. 
Also, I think that much active listening will need to take 
place. That means a lot of "what I hear you saying is..." 
and "No, what I mean is..." Finally, I think it will take 
an honoring of emotions in a way that allows knowledge 
to be heard. I say this about theory, not because I think 
the feminist movement needs diverse women to do theory 
together. No, I say this with the recognition that women 
may want to explore this possibility as we strive to 
articulate our lives and relationships.
Audre: "Within the interdependence of mutual (non 
dominant) differences lies that security which enables 
us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and return with 
the true visions of our future, along with the concomitant 
power to effect those changes which can bring that future 
into being. Difference is that raw and powerful connection 
from which our personal power is forged."
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POSTPARTUM
It has been two months now since I have finished these 
papers and participated in the thesis dialogue. With good 
reason, I have decided to name this final section 
postpartum. You know, that after-thesis, masters degree 
depression. The depression which comes from having 
something be part of you then separate, and realizing that 
it is independent.
The papers offered in this thesis are not merely 
academic exercises, but they have life. In some ways,
I feel as if they are my children. I have nurtured them, 
cared for them, worked with them, molded them, and exposed 
my vulnerability in them. When it came time for my thesis 
dialogue, I had to let these children go. These papers, 
these thoughts and feelings, now exist independent from 
me and can be respected or scoffed according to the will 
of the reader. As a writer, I want these papers to be 
cared for and read sympathetically; yet, this is something 
over which I have no control.
I believe in a vision which these papers offer - a 
vision of mutual dialogue, communication, and respectful 
listening. This is why I asked for a thesis dialogue, 
rather than a defense. I wanted to live the vision of 
people working together rather that against each other.
I wanted people participating in the dialogue to be able
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to explore our own prejudices and abuses of power.
Perhaps because I am new at this, and perhaps because 
I am naive, I thought that my papers would radically reshape 
how people interacted with each other. Thus, I was 
devastated when during the thesis dialogue two male 
professors spoke over and interrupted a female student.
I was angry when I saw how this incident served to silence 
the other students in the room. Not one of them spoke 
again until I specifically asked them a question and gave 
them structured space in which to talk. Then each one 
of them spoke eloquently and articulately. They had 
obviously put much thought into their words. I was also 
disturbed when we spoke at length about how I had 
misinterpreted 'science', rather than explore how we 
perpetuate racism in our institutions. Obviously, it is 
easier for thirteen university educated white people sitting 
in a philosophy library to speak about science rather than 
racism. I hold all of us accountable, because I believe 
in the vision that everyone's voice be heard, and that 
we all be self-reflective in our interactions with each 
other.
So, things were not as perfect as I had hoped. There 
were still abuses of power and a refusal to look at our 
own "isms". Yet now, after two months and further 
reflection, I have made peace with the thesis dialogue.
I do this, because I respect and honor the effort made
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by every person in that room. The dialogue was different 
from a traditional defense, and people took cues from 
each other on how to act. I am inspired by both the 
professor who came up to me and apologized for speaking
too much, and the female student who struggled to overcome
her fear of speaking in a group. Just as I experimented 
with form in the papers, we all explored new ways of
relating with each other in an academic setting. A great
thanks to everyone who participated in the thesis dialogue!
Now that I have voiced my objections, I must answer 
two objections about these papers. The thesis committee 
has taken issue with the discussion of the conception of 
self in the first paper, and the characterization of science 
in the second paper. I have agreed to speak to these 
objections. Perhaps exploring these critiques will add 
insight into the process of writing and exploring in 
philosophical form.
In the first paper on pornography, it was objected 
that the Cheney/Gilligan discussion of self was tacked 
on and distracting. I find this to be an interesting 
objection. In fact during the thesis dialogue when I was 
asked why I had included this discussion in the paper,
I had thought that he had understood the foundation of 
my argument. I smiled at the insightful question and 
proceed to explain why this discussion was important.
The masculine self, I argued, gives rise to the legal
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liberal tradition which makes it possible to subjugate 
lives to principles. In contrast, the feminist concept 
of self envisions a self in relation and allows for a legal 
revolution in which concrete, particular and diverse lives 
come to the forefront. Yes, I reasoned, how one sees 
oneself is directly related to how one lives in the world.
Upon rereading this paper, however, I can understand 
why a reader would find the discussion of self distracting 
even while I can understand why the conceptions of self 
are integral to the paper. As a writer, I think I have 
come to a resolution of this tension in the third paper.
In the paper on racism, the feminist conception of self 
is also integral to the paper, but I did not need to 
explicitly discuss it. Rather, I explored this conception 
of self in the form of the paper. Through the dialogue 
structure, long quotations and personal interaction with 
the material, I could explore what it means to be a self 
in relation. This attention to exemplification seems a 
more powerful and exciting way to write. This is another 
clear example of how the form of the paper can be an 
integral part of expression.
The objection to the second paper is much more 
problematic. It was said that Ken and my description of 
science was too hardlined and simplistic, as if science 
were separate from the people who practiced it and 
oppressive by nature. Yet, Ken and my point is that a
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practice can not be isolated and viewed independently. 
Practice, whether in the form of science or burrowing, 
is embedded within a complex system. Difference is seen 
when one views the practice immersed in a complex worldview. 
To make this point more clear, I will refer back to the 
paper and discuss two different worldviews in which the 
practices of science/burrowing are immersed. A useful 
way to do this will be to look at the conception of self 
and the assumptions about knowledge that are embedded in 
the worldviews of the AERO farmers and the practitioners 
of agribusiness.
The AERO farmers are clearly articulating a conception 
of self that is vastly different from a patriarchal western 
conception of self. As mentioned in the first paper, this 
masculine conception of self is viewed as isolated and 
separate. It is a self that acts upon something, rather 
than in relation. In contrast, the AERO farmers describe 
a self in relation similar to the self discussed by Gilligan 
and Cheney. Refer to the second paper and listen carefully 
to how one AERO farmer describes his relationship with 
the land: "the technique I feel most valuable is fine
tuning my observational skills. To become intimate with 
my farm." (p. 30 - this and subsequent page numbers refer 
to paper two.) He is using relational language and 
techniques to describe his relationship with the farm.
Another clear contrast is the conception of knowledge,
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both in how knowledge is obtained and who is considered 
an expert knower. The AERO farmers speak about their unique 
and specific farm. They listen to the land and gain 
knowledge from their relation with the land. The idea 
that knowledge is gained by working in a specific context 
also empowers the individual farmer to act on that 
knowledge. Again referring to the second paper, Matheson 
reflects this empowerment of the farmer when she says:
"small groups of farmers develop projects for which we 
provide small grants. We try to nourish relationships 
among farmers, not tell them what to do." (p. 27) Thus, 
the farmer can honor the knowledge gained by intimacy with 
the land as well as honoring him- or herself as a knower.
This is very different from the agribusiness approach 
to knowledge and experts. I have learned much by speaking 
with my great-uncle Gordon who farms in Minnesota. Because 
of economic and societal pressures, he has become highly 
dependent on agribusiness. He describes with frustration 
going to an office to check in. There he listens to a 
person behind a computer tell him what to do on his farm.
The information he is given is general for an entire region. 
He is told what to do, rather than develop ideas himself.
He grumbles about all of this, talks about how it used 
to be, wonders if he'll ever get out of debt, and if he 
will be able to maintain his small farm as large 
corporations buy up the farms in his community.
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Clearly, then the worldviews in which science or 
burrowing are practiced are vastly different. People in 
each may use scientific tools, such as a test plot, but 
there is a difference in the orientation, attitudes and 
results.
* * *
So there you have it - exploration in form, 
explorations in thought processes, and explorations in 
honesty. I am so grateful that I had the opportunity to 
write these papers. Many things came together - a strong 
women's community, the newly formed women's studies 
department, the agreement of Nancy Cook and Tom Huff to 
be on the thesis committee, and especially an unimaginably 
wonderful thesis advisor. With the presence, support, 
and insightful criticism from Deborah Slicer, I was able 
to explore in content and structure. All of this adds 
to my clarity about the importance of supporting each other 
as we find our own voices and as we listen to the voices 
of others.
